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CORPORATE POLITICAL AFFAIRS PROGRAMS
THE recent flowering of the business-in-politics movement 1 adds new
dimensions to an old problem: what limitations should the law impose on
corporate political activity? Corporations have always been involved in
politics. In the nineteenth century this involvement took the form of campaign
contributions, unregulated lobbying, and often bribery.2 The more detrimental
effects of these activities have been largely curbed, bribery and contributions
by Corrupt Practices Acts and lobbying by strict registration requirements.3
But a new and more significant form of corporate political activity has been
developing in recent years. In part, this development has been a reaction to
the growth of Big Government, a negative attempt to avoid the irritating
impact of government regulation 4 and a positive effort to share in govern-
mentally dispensed benefits.6 It has been stimulated by the emergence of a
new philosophy of corporate behavior, which teaches that corporations must
discharge social as well as commercial responsibilities. 6
The problem is presented in its most acute form when political programs
are adopted by large publicly held corporations controlled by their own man-
1. See Bart, Big Corporations Mount Soapboxes, the N.Y. Times, May, 29, 1960, § 3,
p. 1, col. 2; Opinion Research Corp., Realistic Policy for Business in Politics, 45-49
(October 1959) ; Hazard, It Takes Money To Get Elected, The Atlantic, Feb. 1960, p. 92;
Taft, Should Business Go In For Politics, N.Y. Times Magazine, Aug. 30, 1959, p. 10.
2. See SiKEs, CoauPr PRAcricEs LEGISLATION 188-92 (1928).
3. See, e.g., Federal Corrupt Practices Act, § 301, 43 Stat. 1070 (1925), 2 U.S.C. §§
241-56 (1958); 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1958); Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, 60 Stat.
839 (1946), 2 U.S.C. §§ 261-70 (1958) ; THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF TEE CITY OF
NEW YORK, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND FEDERAL SERvIcE 144 (1960) [hereinafter cited
as CONFLICT OF INTEREST].
4. See, e.g., A Political Program For Gulf Oil Corporation, June, 1959, p. 2 [here-
inafter cited as GULF PROGRAM]. Hazard, supra note 1, at 92-93. See also the N.Y. Times,
Jan. 21, 1961, p. 32, col. 5 (utilities seek to terminate federal power project).
5. See, e.g., Advertisement, Ass'n of Amer. R.R., Harv. Bus. Rev., Mar.-April 1960,
p. 43 (plea for greater public solicitude).
6. One of the earliest expressions of this philosophy is Dodd, For Whom Are Cor-
porate Managers Trustees, 45 HARv. L. REv. 1145 (1932). Modern echoes are legion. See,
e.g., Advertisement, N.Y. Times Book Review Section, Jan. 8, 1961, p. 30 ("Pitney-
Bowles is more than an economic unit; it is a socially conscious institution."); Have
Corporations A Higher Duty Than Profits?, Fortune, Aug. 1960, p. 108; Hazard, supra
note 1, at 93; LIvNGSTONE, THE AMERICAN SHAREHOLDER 219-20 (1958) ; BERLE, POWER
WITHOUT PROPERTY 8 (1959). The "corporate citizenship" theme, has been taken up by
courts. See, e.g., Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Trustees, Inc., 8 Utah 2d 103, 106, 329 P.2d 398
(1958) ; A. P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 13 N.J. 145, 98 A.2d 581 (1953). It has led to
an impressive increase in the flow of corporate funds into charitable activities, Union Pac.
R.R. v. Trustees, supra, as well as a renewed sense of self-importance for businessmen.
See, e.g., Advertisement by International Latex Corp., The N.Y. Times, April 26, 1960,
p. 14, col. 1 ("You and every man in business are trustees of this nation and the world").
For dissenting views, see Kelso, Corporate Benevolence or Welfare Distribution?, 15
Bus. LAW. 259, 266 (1960) ; Rostow, supra note 2, at 46, 59-71.
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agement-what Dean Rostow has called "endocratic corporations."' 7 Endocratic
corporations can place enormous power behind political programs, bringing to
bear all the organized resources of money and talent which underlie their com-
mercial success.8 Their programs may be particularly effective because of the
skill and experience acquired by these corporations in the use of new techniques
of mass persuasion.9
These modern attempts at corporate political action present more subtle
problems than the traditional forms of corporate politicking. While these prob-
lems are by no means peculiar to the endocratic corporation, but indeed arise
in some form whenever great wealth is controlled by few persons, it is im-
possible to consider the distinct problems raised by each institution in a single
Comment. This Comment will describe the new forms of corporate political
activity, analyze their impact upon shareholders, employees, and the public,
and explore alternative means of regulation.
VARIETIES OF CORPORATE POLITICAL ACTIVITY
Corporate political affairs programs take three forms: (1) attempts to
create public support for selected legislative goals, specific legislation, or
particular candidates; (2) maintenance of training programs designed to
develop the political skills and interests of employees; and (3) provisions
for employee participation in political activity during business hours. To con-
stitute a "program" the activity must be in furtherance of a continuing policy,
consciously adopted by corporate officials. So defined, isolated instances of
one or another of the above activities are excluded from consideration.
To provide a factual basis for this Comment a Political Activity Question-
naire was sent to a group of the largest corporations in the United States
chosen on the basis of size. Of one hundred and fifty corporations solicited,
thirty two replied. Unfortunately, the small number of useful replies makes
meaningful generalization impossible. When appropriate, however, results of
the poll have been utilized to indicate the variety of arrangements and subject
matter involved in these programs.' 0
Generating Public Support
The responses illustrate the varied means utilized to create widespread sup-
port among employees, shareholders, and the public for specific legislation or
7. Dean Rostow has attributed the term to Herman W. Liebert. See Rostow, To
Whom and For What Ends Is Corporate Management Responsible, in MAsoN, THE COR-
PORATION IN MODERN SocIETY 46, 302-03 nn.1 & 2 (1960).
8. See Kelso, supra note 6, at 262; BERLE, THE TWENTIETH CENTURY CArrMALsT
REVOLUTION 162-63 (1954).
9. See Ross, THE IMAGE MERCHANTS 27 (1959); Cf. PIMLOTT, PUBLIC RELATIONS
AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 71-77 (1951) (discussing dangers of federal government's use
of public relations techniques to mold opinion).
10. Of those responding, ten did not fill out the form but supplied some information.
Questionnaire responses are cited QUESTIONNAiRE.
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particular candidates and for selected axioms of political and economic theory.
Political propaganda has been disseminated though shareholder reports,"
employee newsletters,12 intracompany memoranda, 1 3 advertisements in mass
media publications,' 4 posters on company premises, 1 notices in employee pay
envelopes, 16 pamphlets distributed to employees, 17 and movies shown to
them. 18 Other sources indicate that corporations frequently contribute to
civic, educational, and business organizations which support legislation or a
political view-point favored by corporate officials. 19 Barred from making direct
The Yale Law Journal wishes to thank those corporate officials who were kind enough
to fill out the questionnaires and to supply documents and other supplementary materials
which have proven useful in the preparation of this Comment.
11. See, e.g., Mutual of New York, 114th Annual Report 6-8 (1956) ; Jones & Laugh-
lin Steel Corp., 1956 Annual Report 2; General Electric, 1959 Annual Report 25; Virginia
Electric and Power Co., Quarterly Report, June, 1959. Of thirteen companies answering
this section of the questionnaire, ten utilized shareholder reports to communicate political
views to shareholders.
12. All thirteen companies answering this section of the questionnaire utilized com-
pany newsletters for political comment.
Some of these comments were keyed to the recent national election. See Bart, supra
note 1.
13. This medium was utilized by eleven companies who sought to create a favorable
political climate, and by ten companies supporting specific legislation. Schering Corp. (not
one of the companies polled), urged its employees to contact their Congressmen to urge
passage without amendment of the Eisenhower aid to the aged bill and defeat of the For-
rant Bill. The company identified the bills by number only and urged co-operating em-
ployees to send copies of their letters either to the company or to a trade association of
which it was a member. Kempton, Don't Write-Telegraph, The N.Y. Post, Aug. 25,
1960, p. 37, col. 1. See BAUMER & HERZBERG, POLITICS IS YOUR BUSINESS 41 (1960) (bring
"facts" to attention of employees so they may judge for themselves) ; id. at 130-31 (news
bulletins for "guidance") [hereinafter cited as BAUMER & HERZBERG] ; Companies' Role
in the Election, Business Week, Nov. 26, 1960, p. 36 (company v.p. urges employees to
vote for director running against Senator Douglas).
14. Mass media were utilized by five companies to create a "favorable business
climate" and by three companies to secure passage of selected legislation. QUESTIONNAIRE.
A "favorable business climate" is an attitude on the part of legislators and elected execu-
tives sympathetic to the interests of the corporation as defined by its management. See
Companies' Role in the Election, supra note 13.
15. Only one company used posters to create a favorable climate or support for legis-
lation. QUESTIONNAIRE.
16. This medium has been used only in support of better business climate programs.
QUESTIONNAMIE. State statutes may prohibit use of pay envelope notices to accomplish more
specific political ends. See, e.g., MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 6.1912 (1956).
17. Five companies distributed pamphlets to employees in support of "climate" crea-
tion; six to help generate support for legislation. QUESTIONNAIRE.
18. See authorities cited note 1 supra.
19. See, e.g., State v. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co., 169 Ohio St. 42, 157 N.E.2d 331
(1959); Eastern R.R. President's Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 29 U.S.L.
WEEx 4191 (Sup. Ct., Feb. 20, 1961), Note, 70 YALE L.J. 135 (1960). For an analysis of
the associations through which corporations seek to affect legislative decision, see Com-
ment, 69 YALE LJ. 1017, 1037-48 (1960). Until recently there may have been a tax advan-
tage in using these groups. See generally Comment, 69 YALE L.J. 1017, 1032-50 (1960).
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contributions to candidate and party campaign funds by corrupt practices
legislation, corporations have found several ways to transfer funds secretly.
Employees, attorneys, or public relations counsel collect unearned income with
the understanding that the money, minus adjustments for income taxes pay-
able, will be passed on to parties and candidates. 20 Employee expense accounts
are tapped for tickets to party fund-raising affairs, 21 advertising departments
purchase space in party journals, 22 and earmarked contributions are made
to trade and civic organizations which pass them on to designated politicians.2 3
The corporation may spend the money itself, using its institutional advertising
to propagate ideas clearly associated in the public mind with particular
candidates or a political party.
2 4
The locus of responsibility for selecting and implementing political objec-
tives varies from corporation to corporation. In some corporations one or a
few key officials make this decision, while in others political decision making
has been decentralized to lower echelon executives.2 5 In a few instances special
departments have been created.26 Some companies have delegated a substantial
part of their discretion to business groups and trade associations to which
they contribute.
27
Some corporate political campaigns are directed at national measures closely
related to the company's business operations. For example, oil companies
have mobilized support for retention of the petroleum depletion allowance, 
2 8
and natural gas pipeline companies have campaigned to revise rate-making
standards ;29 electric light and power companies have vigorously opposed
government-sponsored power projects. 30 Other campaigns are directed at
Contributions by regulated corporations to organizations dedicated to influencing the
political process may be disallowed for rate-making purposes. E.g., In the Matter of
Alabama Power Co., F.P.C. Opinion No. 337 (Aug. 17, 1960).
20. See Egan v. United States, 137 F.2d 369, 374 (8th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320
U.S. 788 (1943).
21. HEARD, THE CosTs OF DEMOCRACY 134, 237 (1960) [hereinafter cited as HEARD].
22. Id. at 134, 239.
23. Id. at 237-38.
24. Hearings Before Senate Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections of the Com-
mittee on Rules and Administration to Investigate the 1950 Ohio Senatorial Campaign,
82d Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 180-82, 424 (1952) ; Bicks & Friedman, Regulation of Federal
Election Finance: A Case of Misguided Morality, 28 N.Y.U.L. REv. 975, 995 & n.7 (1953).
25. QUESTiONNAnR.
26. See BAUMER & HERZBERG 130; Bart, supra note 1.
27. See authorities cited note 19 supra. Policies of the organization, however, may at
times differ from that of the corporation. See Taft, supra note 1.
28. GULF PROGRAM.
29. For descriptions of the natural gas companies' campaigns, see Ross, THE IMAGE
MERCHANTS 20 (1959) ; Senate Hearings Before the Special Committee to Investigate
Political Activities, Lobbying and Campaign Contributions, Oil & Gas Lobby Investiga-
tion, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1957).
30. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1961, p. 32, col. 5; In the Matter of Alabama Power
Co., F.P.C. Opinion No. 337 (Aug. 17, 1960). Thirty-five companies spent just under
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measures or political attitudes having an impact on business generally. 31
Labor reform,3 2 inflation, 33 free enterprise,3 4 and "right-to-work" laws 35 ex-
emplify these objectives. Legislation having no direct impact upon business,
such as old age health assistance plans 36 aid to public education 37 and sub-
versive control activities 3s have also been the objective of business campaigns.
Finally, corporations have sought to influence the outcome of local political
struggles, campaigning in favor of issues such as school improvement 3 0 and
consumer credit reporting statutes.
40
Most literature in this area claims that the programs are "nonpartisan." 41
The stands taken on highly controversial issues such as right-to-work laws or
medical care for the aged 42 indicate that "nonpartisan" is used in its narrow-
est sense. In some cases, moreover, companies have admitted exerting in-
fluence over local and national elections. 43 And while get-out-the-vote pro-
paganda need not favor one party, it can be so administered. 44
At least in some instances, the corporation's political ideas are sold with
the same public relations techniques used to sell its products. Those claiming
$2,000,000 on the "Electric Companies Advertising Program." Id. at 3. For examples of
their publicity, see id., appendix A.
31. See Mitau, Control over Campaign Finance, 23 U. CHI. L. REv. 620, 636 (1956).
See also BAUMER & HERZ3ERG 23 ("business climate" advertising).
32. QUESTIONNAIRE. One company fought a New Jersey law which would have paid
unemployment benefits to strikers. BAUMER & HERZBERG 22.
33. E.g., The Atlantic, Feb. 1960, p. 95 (advertisement); BAUMIER & HERZBERG 22;
QUESTIONNAIRE (fifteen companies had anti-inflation programs).
34. For a critical analysis of the free enterprise campaign, see WHYTE, Is ANYBODY
LISTENING? 1-20, 29 (1952) (questioning the reality of a serious threat of socialist success
in the United States). One purpose of corporate political programs is to fight socialism.
BAUMER & HERZ3ERG 73.
35. Letter to George B. Driesen From E. Jagust, Share Owner Relations Dept., Gen-
eral Electric Co., (June 11, 1959), on file Yale Law Library.
36. See Bart, supra note 1; Kempton, Don't Write-Telegraph, N.Y. Post, Aug. 25,
1960, p. 37, col. 1.
37. See Bart, supra note 1.
38. QUESTIONNAIRE.
39. See State v. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co., 169 Ohio St. 42, 157 N.E.2d 331 (1959);
QUESTIONNAIRE; BAUMER & HERZBERG 23.
40. QUESTIONNAIRE.
41. See GULF PROGRAM p. 6; BAUMER & HERZBERG 30-33; Scott Paper Co., Our Re-
sponsibilities in Political Affairs in Official Program, 1960 Democratic National Conven-
tion, p. 79. See also Krock, Business Men As Agents of Public Policy, N.Y. Times, Oc-
tober 30, 1959, "p. 26, col. 4.
42. See notes 35, 36 supra. -
43. One G.E. plant manager gave his company's political education program credit for
the overwhelmingly favorable voter response in Syracuse, N.Y., to Vice-President Nixon
and defeat of an incumbent Congressman. Companies' Role in the Election, Business Week,
Nov. 26, 1960, pp. 34, 36.
44. See, e.g., Unions Enter Political Arena With Drive to Get Out The Vote, Busi-
ness Week, Aug. 27, 1960, pp. 108, 110.
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the ability to engineer consent have described their methods in detail. 40 The
"public" most likely to influence those with whom the power of decision lies
must be identified. A substantial percentage of that public must initially be
either uncommitted or favorably disposed to the corporation's view-point if the
campaign is to be successful. Having selected the relevant "public," the public
relations expert must ascertain its dominant aspirations and prejudices. By
the use of themes and symbols likely to appeal to these attitudes, a favorable
group consensus can be created. To supplement the "engineering of consent,"
an appearance of public support may be simulated through third party tech-
niques-the formation of purportedly independent civic and educational or-
ganizations which lend their support to the campaign.
4 7
Political Education of Employees
In order to stimulate the political interest of employees and to encourage
managers publicly to express their views, a few corporations have recently
inaugurated political training courses.48 Often they are held during business
hours.49 Most of these courses are based upon a series of pamphlets prepared
for this purpose by the United States Chamber of Commerce. 0 Discussion
conferences led by teachers, local politicians, and employees develop the ideas
contained in these pamphlets. In one case discussions and workshops are keyed
to motion pictures, prepared for the company by a university, in which experts
describe the federal constitutional system, the role of the Supreme Court, the
need for individual political action, the function of pressure groups, campaign
46. See BERNAYS, THE ENGINEERING OF CONSENT 11, 29, 31-32, 54-93, 138-55 (1955).
For examples of effective, albeit oftentimes misleading, use of symbols by PR technicians,
see Ross, THE IMAGE MERCHANTS 70, 75, 76, 80 (1959).
47. See, e.g., Hearings Before the Special [Senate] Committee to Investigate Political
Activities, Lobbying and Campaign Contributions, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 613-40 (1957);
Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. v. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference, 155 F. Supp. 768 (E.D.
Pa. 1957), aff'd per curiam, 273 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1959), rev'd, 29 U.S.L. WEEI 4191
(Sup. Ct., Feb. 20, 1961), Note, 70 YALE L.J. 135, 138 & n28 (1950) ; Ross, op. cit. supra
note 46, at 109-24. Lower courts in Noerr held these tactics beyond the pale of constitu-
tional protection, against public policy, and illegal. The Supreme Court reversed.
48. QUESTIONNAIRE; BAUmER & HERZBERG 46, 109-14. All but one of the programs
described by respondents to the Questionnaire were initiated in 1959 or 1960.
On the effectiveness of these programs in stimulating employee political participation
see BAUMER & HERZBERG 118-20; Companies' Role in the Election, Business Week, Nov.
26, 1960, p. 34.
49. Nine companies hold classes during business hours; seven do not. QUESTIONNAIR.
One of the advantages of evening classes is that wives may attend.
The most ambitious program reported required 30 hours; two companies had a series
of classes aggregating eight hours. The median number of hours was sixteen. QUESTION-
NAIRE.
50. QUESTIONNAIRE. The Chamber course is described in BAUmER & HERZBERG 113-
14. See also Barnett, Politics Given 'Shot in Arm' by Business, New Haven Evening
Register, May 5, 1960, p. 62, col. 8.
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techniques, and the like.51 Of the companies which responded to the Question-
naire, slightly more than half permit employees on all levels to participate;
the others at present restrict enrollment to salaried and supervisory per-
sonnel. 2
Released Time
To permit employees actively to participate in political campaigns, a few
companies have adopted an express policy permitting absences during regular
business hours. 3 Responses to the Questionnaire showed that six of the nine
companies which permit such absences compensate the employee for the
time spent in political activity. 4 Only one company extended the "released
time" privilege to production line employees, the rest granting absence only
to supervisory and salaried personnel. 55 Several companies encourage their
employees to seek political office. Staff and management employees are granted
leaves of absence with or without pay (depending upon the term of the office)
and, where applicable law permits, without loss of vacation privileges, service
awards, insurance, and other "fringe benefits." 56
IMPACT OF CORPORATE POLITICAL PROGRAMS
The Corporation
A company's political persuasion program may be an important factor in
its economic success. The ability to generate public support may be used
defensively-to resist government measures likely to decrease profits--or
offensively-to secure adoption of measures which will assist the company
to increase its income.
51. The company's description of its course indicates that it offers employees a rather
sophisticated introduction to civics and government along with instruction in the practi-
calities of politics. Less emphasis on "practical politics" and greater attention to the com-
plex nature of the problems facing government and the tools with which it solves them
has been suggested by critics. See Reagan, The Seven Fallacies of Business In Politics,
43 HARV. Bus. REv. 60, 64-65 (1960) ; Taft, supra note 1, at 65.
52. Several companies expressed an intention to broaden participation in the future.
53. Nine companies have such policies. Most have been initiated since 1957. QuESTION-
NAME. In addition, officers of some corporations devote full time to their company's polit-
ical interests. HEARD 133; see Taft, supra note 1, at 10.
54. One important industrial corporation pays hourly rated employees for part-time
political activity at the rate they would be have earned on-the job. Employees must first
attempt to be placed on a shift that will not conflict with their political duties. National
Industrial Conference Board, Proceedings of the Conference on Company Participation In
The Political Process (March 17, 1960). None of the companies account separately for
this compensation and thus the cost of this program, like others discussed in this Comment,
is not known by management. QUESTIONNAIRE.
55. QUESTIONNAIRE.
56. Statements of policy supplied by respondents to Questionnaire. These statements
indicate an awareness of the problems posed by Corrupt Practices Acts and Conflict of
Interest statutes.
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Released-time programs may also improve a corporation's profit picture.
By permitting employees to serve in elective and appointive positions, the cor-
poration may secure public contracts not otherwise available to it. A former
employee will be familiar with the capabilities of the corporation and will
therefore be likely to recommend its services to governmental officials.57
Such an employee can also serve as a source of information concerning
government projects of which the company may be unaware. When the
released-time program makes possible the election of former employees to
public office, moreover, the corporation may secure direct representation for
its point of view in state, federal, or local legislatures. 8 A former employee
can be expected to remain sympathetic to the views of the corporation which
employed him and from which he may continue to receive some benefits while
in office.59 Even when such benefits are terminated during his term of public
service the employee may look foward to a return to his former role with the
company. Released-time programs may also create good will in local com-
munites where company facilities are located by demonstrating the corpora-
tion's concern for the well-being of the community. 60
Political training programs supplement the benefits provided by released-
time policies by increasing the probability that managerial employees will be-
come instrumental in the formulation of party policy and will be elected or
appointed to governmental positions.
Corporate political programs are not without costs and dangers. Managerial
and financial resources appropriated for political activity are diverted from
alternative pursuits which might be more profitable. 61 And if the corporation
57. See Hearings Before the Permanent Subcommittee On Investigations of the Senate
Committee On Government Operatioas Concerning Harold E. Talbott, Secretary of the
Air Force, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955). The official involved resigned.
58. See BAUMER & HERZBERG 78.
59. See CoNFLIcrs OF INTEREST 20. Continuation of benefits may be prohibited for
some offices by conflict of interest legislation, and companies are generally aware of this
limitation. See note 56 supra.
60. Local affairs are emphasized. See QUESTIONNAIRE (supplemental materials) ; GULF
PRoGR m 4. But see Taft, supra note 1, at 64.
61. One company's policy memorandum struggles with the problem as follows:
Normally such activities will be on an individual's own time, on those occasions
where he may find it necessary to request a reasonable period of time off for that
purpose, his request will be granted if it does not conflict with the performance of
his duties .... If the political office is of a part time nature that would normally
require the individual's own time but on occasions may require him to request a
reasonable amount of time off from his ... work, his supervisor will grant any such
request if, in the supervisor's judgment, it does not conflict with the individual's
responsibilities in the [company] or otherwise impede [its] operations.
An individual who is elected or appointed to any local or state legislative office
and is required to be absent from the [company] in order to attend sessions of the
legislative body of which he is a member, will continue to receive his full pay dur-
ing such periods of absence provided such absences do not extend into a major
portion of the calendar year.
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unsuccessfully attempts to defeat a candidate 62 or vigorously opposes mea-
sures favored by one party, the victorious candidate or party might retaliate
by instituting embarrassing investigations of the corporation's business or by
supporting legislation hostile to its interests. A pronounced political coloration
involves other disadvantages. Persons whose political convictions are antithet-
ical to those of the company may find the climate created by its programs
uncongenial and may refuse to accept employment.6 3 Finally, state conflict
of interest laws may deprive companies whose employees are public officials
of profitable business opportunities and other benefits. Common law rules,64
statutes, 65 and local ordinances 66 prevent employees 67 and shareholders 68
from participating in the quasi-judicial decisions of state and local govern-
ments benefitting their employer. Under the heading of quasi-judicial decision,
courts include contract awards, 69 grants of privileges, 70 and tax benefits. 71 In
some states the mere participation of an employee in the decisional process
voids an action benefitting his employer.72 On the other hand, a few states
will void the transaction only if the employee casts a deciding vote.73 The
majority, however, will strike down the transaction if an employee has cast
a ballot regardless of the margin by which it passed.74 A conflict of interest
62. Several companies reported they had sought to help elect candidates by using the
communications media described in the Questionnaire.
63. The competition for capable management personnel is very keen. A company can
lose key personnel by a comparatively noncontroversial get-out-the-vote campaig . See
Companies' Role in the Election, Business Week, No. 20, 1960, p. 34. See also Taft, Should
Business Go In For Politics?, N.Y. Times Magazine, Aug. 30, 1959, p. 64 (business in
politics campaign looks like it is against all progress).
64. See generally 4 ScoTr, TRUSTS §§ 496-503 (2d ed. 1956) ; 2 DILLON, MUNICIPAL
CORPORTIO S § 773 (5th ed. 1911).
65. Grady v. Livingstone, 115 Mont. 47, 141 P.2d 346 (1943) (discussing several
statutes).
66. See, e.g., Buflington Wheel Co. v. Burnham, 60 Iowa 493, 15 N.W. 282 (1883).
67. See, e.g., Stockton Plumbing & Supply Co. v. Wheeler, 68 Cal. App. 592, 601-02,
229 Pac. 1020, 1024 (Dist. Ct. App. 1924). Contra, County Ct. v. Grafton, 77 W. Va. 84,
86 S.E. 924 (1915).
68. Foster v. Cape May, 60 N.J.L. 78, 36 Atl. 1089 (Sup. Ct. 1897) ; Note, 12 RUTGERS
L. REV. 582, 589-90 (1958) ; Annot., 140 A.L.R. 344 (1942) (collecting cases). One com-
mentator has questioned the wisdom of applying this rule when the stock is publicly held.
Note, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 985, 993 (1959).
69. See Miller v. City of Martinez, 28 Cal. App. 2d 364, 82 P.2d 519 (Dist. Ct. App.
1938) ; Grady v. Livingstone, 115 Mont. 47, 141 P.2d 346 (1943).
70. Pyatt v. Mayor and Council of Dunellen, 9 N.J. 548, 89 A.2d 1 (1952) (Brennan,
J.) ; Annot., 133 A.L.R. 1257, 1263-64 (1941) (collecting cases). Issuing a license is also
a quasi-judicial act. Compare City of Miami Beach v. Schauer, 104 So. 2d 129 (Fla. Ct.
App. 1958) (zoning ordinance not quasi-judicial).
71. The conflict would arise through participation in tax appraisals of property.
72. Pressey v. Hillsborough, 37 N.J. Super. 486, 117 A.2d 646 (App. Div. 1955)
certif. denied, 20 N.J. 303, 119 A.2d 789 (1956) (participation in deliberation). Compare,
Note, 12 RUTGERS L. REv. 582, 594 (1958).
73. See Annot. 133 A.L.R. 1257, 1263-64 (1941).
74. Miller v. City of Martinez, 28 Cal. App. 2d 364, 82 P.2d 519 (Dist. Ct. App. 1938);
Ifills v. Town Plan Comm'n, 144 Conn. 493, 134 A.2d 250 (1957) ; Rollin v. Connor, 74
N.H. 456, 69 Atl. 777 (1908).
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deprives a corporation not only of the benefit of its contract, but also, in
most states, of any recovery in quasi-contract for goods or services supplied.7
In addition, an employee who has improperly participated in such a transaction
may be subjected to criminal sanctions."8
The Employee
Training in practical politics and in the history and function of democratic
institutions will broaden the employee's understanding of the society in which
he lives. And if an employee long interested in political activity or newly
stimulated by the training he has received wishes to participate in "politics,"
released-time programs and explicit company approval will encourage him to
do so. 77 These activities, in turn, enable an employee to make personal contacts
and to develop speech techniques, organizational ability, and other political
skills which will prove useful in his work for the company.78
But the impact of a corporation's political program upon an employee might
well be adverse. If, as a result of his election to public office, he incurs liability
under a conflict of interest statute 79 or he is forced to divest himself of stock
holdings in the company,80 his financial well-being may be impaired. More
significantly, these programs could threaten political independence of some
employees. An official company attitude toward legislative or ideological
questions might be transmitted to persons with promotional authority who
could make acceptance of these attitudes a factor in hiring and advancement. 8'
Employees may be particularly vulnerable to coercive pressures when political
75. Miller v. City of Martinez, supra note 74. This is the majority rule, see Grady v.
Livingstone, 115 Mont. 47, 65, 141 P.2d 346, 355 (1943) (dissenting opinion). Contra,
Grady v. Livingstone, .rtpra. For a detailed discussion, see Lillich, Municipal Conflicts of
Interest: Rights and Remedies Under an Invalid Contract, 27 FoRDHAm L. REv. 31 (1958).
76. E.g., N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A:135-8 (1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 839-09 (1944);
Note, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 985, 988 & n.16 (1959) (collecting statutes). On the federal
statutes, see McElwain & Vorenberg, The Federal Conflict of Interest Statutes, 65 HARv.
L. REv. 955 (1952) ; Davis, The Federal Conflict of Interest Laws, 54 CoLum. L. REV.
893 (1954). "Anyone who takes a job in Washington may be relying on a lawyer's bad
guess, and... may end up in the penitentiary-at least in theory." Solow, Conflict of In-
terest: A Legal Nightmare, Fortune, Jan. 1961, p. 97-99. For a general analysis of the
statutes, see CONFLICT OF INTEREST 36-71. The statutes, both state and federal, are badly in
need of overhaul. Id. at 180-84. See Kaplan & Lillich, Municipal Conflicts of Interest, 58
COLUM. L. REv. 157, 181-82 (1958) ; Solow, supra at 97,99.
77. These programs have apparently been successful in inducing employees to run for
office and to assist their parties. See Companies' Role in The Election, supra note 63;
BAUmER & HERZBERG 131.
78. Barnett, Politics Given 'Shot In Arm' by Business, New Haven Evening Register,
May 5, 1960, p. 62, col. 8. The problems facing modern management, moreover, are said to
be primarily political. BEE, POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY 67-68 (1959).
79. See note 76 supra.
80. Although not required by statute, divestment has been a problem for corporate
officers entering the federal service. See, e.g., CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 96.
81. Promotion to high positions in the corporate hierarchy is said to be almost en-
tirely dependent upon "acceptability." MILLS, THE POWER ELITE 141, 142, 144 (1956). See
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training sessions are conducted by company personnel.8 2 Pressure to conform
to these company attitudes may exist even if top management does not con-
sciously intend to impose its will upon junior executives. As a result of his
desire to conform to corporate norms, the employee may feel compelled to
suppress his other extracurricular interests in order to participate actively
in politics after business hours 83 or to disassociate himself from political
ideas or organizations which he believes are disapproved. 4 Finally, recent
psychological studies indicate that when an individual feels compelled to pre-
tend acceptance of an idea at variance with his privately held convictions,
and does so for a reward he considers mean or inadequate, he will tend to
alter his private convictions.85
The Public
Political training and released-time programs will also confer some benefits
on the public. These programs, in so far as they make available to political
generally BERLE, POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY 79-80 (1959). Latham, The Body Politic of
the Corporation, in MASON, THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOcIrTY 230, 232 (1959). Pre-
sumably, organized employees will not be affected by company political pressures because
promotion up to the level of foreman is often governed by contract.
States have passed statutes seeking, to a very limited extent, to prevent the employment
relation from being utilized to compel political conformity. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §
104.081 (1960) ; MICH. STAT. ANN. § 6.1912 (1956) ; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, §§ 5161-63
(1953) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 211.24 (1946).
82. Company personnel conducted political training classes for fourteen of the sixteen
companies responding to the Questionnaire. There is no direct evidence of any attempts to
utilize training programs to influence employee political views. But see, Companies' Role
In The Election, supra note 63, at 36 (plant manager credits large majority for presidential
candidate to "better political education") ; cf. BAUMER & HERZBERG 28 (viewing political
education of employees and propagation of management's ideas as part of same process).
83. One company's policy statement promises "employees are completely free to take
part or not as they choose." QUESTIONNAIRE. But another provides, "[T]he program will
... insist that all Gulf personnel involved work with local political leaders and elected repre-
sentatives.... [I]ncentives need not be offered, but recognition of particularly outstanding
. . . political contributions by employees in Company publications will be made." GULF
PROGRAm 4, 6. Explaining how one company induced lower level management to take the
course, the assistant director of advertising and public relations of Armstrong Cork Co.
explained that there was no problem, "The President just said 'Everybody ought to.'"
Barnett, Politics Given 'Shot in Arm" By Business, New Haven Evening Register, May 5,
1960, p. 62, col. 8. Wives are included in the company plans. GULF PRoGRA.PM 6; BAUMER &
HERZBERG 32, 38.
Analogous problems have been created for employees by corporations embracing the
virtues of civic participation, and charitable activities. See, Long, The Corporation, Its
Satellites, and The Local Community, in MASON, THE CoRPORATIoN IN MODERN SOCIETY
211 (1959) (employees feel compelled to participate in civic affairs to assure promotion).
84. "Predominantly Republican management has instilled the fear of God in members
of junior management who have an inclination towards the Democratic Party." OPINION
RESEARCH CORP., REALISTIC POLICY FOR BUSINESS IN POLITICS 31 (1959) (citing party
leader).
85. See Note, 70 YALE L.J. 298, 307 & n.51 (1960).
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parties a pool of trained volunteer workers, will reduce campaign costs and
lessen the dependence of parties and candidates upon wealthy individuals or
institutions who may exert an unwarranted influence upon party policy.80
Reduced campaign expenses could promote more effective political opposition
in some communities by enabling reform or independent groups to compete
with better financed incumbent party organizations. Also, participants in
company political training programs constitute a source of knowledgeable
candidates. And these programs could lighten the financial burden of public
service. At present, government is handicapped in the competition for highly
skilled and talented manpower by the higher salaries offered by industry
and business.8 7 Supplementing government pay-checks with corporate fringe
benefits and assuring the employee of an opportunity to return to the company,
so that his long-term career plans are not jeopardized, could partly off-set
the effect of the salary differential. 88
But the efforts of some corporations to encourage employees temporarily
to enter public service also raises serious questions. In a legislature, federal
or state, impartiality is neither expected nor desirable. Indeed, satisfactory
resolution of conflicting interests can best be accomplished by a legislature
whose members actively represent different groups within the electorate.89
One who is appointed to a government post, however, must serve the govern-
ment's interests alone. If an appointee retains financial ties to the corporation,
he may not be completely impartial when its interests indicate one decision
and the "public interest" appears to compel another.90 And even if he were
able to remain impartial while receiving or anticipating benefits from his
former employer, public confidence in government will be impaired if its
officers maintain bonds likely to generate conflicting loyalties.91 On the other
hand, requiring employees to make a complete break with the company
may not be advisable. A complete break, including a termination of salary
and fringe benefits, sale of all the employee's stock in the company, and an
86. See Hearings Before the Special Committee to Investigate Political Activities,
Lobbying, and Campaign Contributions, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 255-56 (1956) (statement by
Walter Reuther).
87. See CoNFtcTs oF INTEREST 140-41. See also id. at 183.
88. See id. at 141, 183.
89. See TE FEDERALIST, No. 10 (Madison); CONFLCT OF INTEREST 14; MEixEL-
JOHN, PoIuTIcAL FREEDox 81 (1960).
90. No dishonesty on the part of the employee-public servant need be implied to reach
this conclusion; conflicting loyalties may prejudice the public interest. See People cX rel.
Schenectady Illuminating Co. v. Board of Supervisors, 166 App. Div. 758, 760, 151 N.Y.
Supp. 1012, 1014 (1915) (dictum) ; Kaplan & Lillich, Municipal Conflicts of Interest: In-
consistencies and Patchwork Prohibitions, 58 CoLum. L. REV. 157, 177-78 (1958) ; CoN-
FLIcT OF INTEREST 144.
91. See CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 6-7.
Even if all benefits are terminated, an employee may retain an interest in the company
inconsistent with devotion to public service. See Yonkers Bus Inc. v. Maltbie, 23 N.Y.S.
2d 87 (Sup. Ct.) (dictum), aff'd, 260 App. Div. 893, 23 N.Y.S2d 91 (3d Dept. 1940).
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agreement not to rehire upon termination of government service, would
solve the conflict of interest problem but might not be in the long run
interest of the government. Qualified employees will be reluctant to enter
government service, and corporations, willing to release employees temporarily
but not to lose them permanently, would be unlikely to encourage them.
A solution to these interacting problems of personnel and dual loyalities
requires a careful selection of the benefits which employees entering govern-
ment service can retain. The benefits allowed should probably differ according
to the government position involved, and the efficacy of other measures,
such as nonparticipation in certain decisions, in bringing about impartial
administration.
92
The legitimacy of political persuasion programs is also questionable. The
objectives of these persuasion campaigns are not chosen by "the corporation"
which is, after all, only a legal category of business organization. Political
policy is made by the top officers or their delegees.93 Because of the dis-
persion of stock ownership and the apathy of most shareholders, these de-
cisions are not subject to review and approval by the corporation's "owners."
Nor is there review by the company's salaried employees, wage earners, and
customers-other groups on whose behalf corporate officers are said to ad-
minister corporate assets.94 As a result, the opinions of the corporation tend to
be the personal opinions of its management.95
The unrepresentative power of corporate officials seems not to pose a
serious problem to present day commentators, who tend to regard the notion
of corporate democracy as obsolete.9 6 In part, this acceptance may be based
92. For a statutory solution to some of the problems, see CONFLICT OF INTEREST 187-310.
93. Reification of "the corporation" is still common. See Hazard, It Takes Money to
Get Elected, The Atlantic, Feb. 1960, p. 92. See also Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate
Managers Trustees, 45 H~Av. L. REv. 1145, 1154-55 (1932).
94. Just who should be included in the corporate "constituency" is the subject of some
debate, Compare Dodd, supra note 93, at 1150 (shareholders, employees, customers and the
public), and Boulware, Owners Can Help Themselves, Address Before American Society
of Corporate Secretaries, June 8, 1960, pp. 4-5, with Rostow, To Whom and For What
Ends is Management Responsible?, in MASON, THE COPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY
68-69, 71 (1959).
95. For a recent example see Advertisement, The New York Times, April 26, 1960
(giving views of International Latex Corp. chairman on foreign policy).
If, as some observers have claimed, there is substantial unanimity of opinion among
highranking corporate officials, cooperative use of corporate treasuries may give their point
of view an excessive advantage in the clamor of competing ideas for public attention and
acceptance. See MILLS, THE POWER ELITE 122, 281-83 (1956) ; Ross, TIEI IAIAGE MER-
CHANTS 27, 34, 42 (1959) ; cf. Note, 66 HARv. L. REv. 1259, 1260 (1953). But cf. Warner,
The Corporation Man, in MASON, THE CORPORATION IN MODERM SociETY 106-21 (1960).
Compare WORIISER, THE FOUNDATIONS: THEIR POWER AND INFLUENCE 54-56 (1958)
(warning of the danger of co-operation between foundations on political matters).
96. See Manning, Book Review, 67 YALE L.J. 1477 (1958). See generally LIVINGSTON,
THE AmERicAN STOCKHOLDER 20, 37-44 (1958); BERLE, POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY
108 (1959).
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upon recognition that the corporation cannot be run democratically. But the
present power of corporate officials also seems acceptable because it retains
a certain legitimacy, based upon a belief that even with this power, manage-
ment will administer corporate assets in the best interests of shareholders,
employees, and others connected with the enterprise.97 In business affairs, a
common interest in profits may assure beneficial administration, and the
business expertise of management seems to justify abnegation of shareholder
control. The recent legislative acceptance of corporate contributions to charity
as proper 98 may have similar foundations in the assumption of a common
consensus to promote charity and a relative lack of controversy about the
merit of one charity against another. Some political programs might also be
found to accord with hypothesized preferences of those economically de-
pendant upon the corporation. Something similar to the consensus about
charity might legitimize political education. Even some choices on political is-
sues-those having a direct relation to the corporation's earnings-might
acquire a mantle of legitimacy on the basis of the shared motive of profits. This
argument might logically be carried further to encompass all management de-
cisions about politics or political ideologies. Any proposal which putatively
improves the security, economic welfare, or social stability of the nation-or
indeed the world-has some relation to profits. Some managers have accepted
the doctrine that corporations have a responsibility to make their views
known on all important issues which affect the national welfare, 99 and this
view is seconded by many others who believe that corporate assets must be ad-
ministered, not only for the shareholders, but for the good of the community.1° °
But when management purports to speak for the corporation, with corporate
assets, on matters of public welfare, the premise of an underlying consensus
would seem to break down. Public welfare is a matter of basic values, on which
shareholders and employees in a publicly held corporation can be expected to
differ. And except for political proposals directly affecting the industry, man-
agement cannot be considered expert in these affairs. The legitimacy of political
persuasion campaigns might also be undermined by a more fundamental objec-
tion to the notion of corporate executives acting as political trustees. Whatever
the legitimacy of delegating control over wealth for profit or to satisfy charit-
able instincts, the democratic political process seems devoted to the idea that
each individual must choose for himself the values he supports.1 1
The endocratic corporation's political activity might also be attacked in
terms of its effect on the whole political process. The disturbing thought is
97. Cf. id. at 99-103.
98. Seee generally Prunty, Love and the Business Corporation, 46 VA. L. REv. 467
(1960).
99. See, e.g., Advertisement by Scott Paper Co., "Our Responsibilities In Political
Affairs," Official Program, 1960 Democratic National Convention, p. 79.
100. See authorities cited note 6 supra.
101. Cf. United States v. International Union United Automobile Workers, 352 U.S.
567, 575 (1957) (dictum) (Frankfurter, J.).
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that a few individuals can mobilize the enormous resources of the endocratic
corporation behind propositions they advocate. This attribute is not peculiar
to the endocratic corporation; it is common to any great aggregation of wealth
controlled by a few persons that may be used for political or ideological per-
suasion-large closely held corporations, unions, nonprofit foundations, and
family fortunes to name a few. In searching out the reasons for disquietude
about this phenomenon, several problems must be distinguished. First there
is the problem of wealth itself. In the field of electioneering, candidates and
sometimes parties are often limited to a certain amount of total expenditure.
10 2
The limitation seems to be based on a belief that, while a certain amount of
money may be necessary to inform the electorate about a candidate or party,
money spent beyond that point serves only to enable one faction to out-shout
the other. A necessary premise, it seems, is that the electorate will respond
irrationally to too much propaganda. This premise, if true, can be applied
to any campaign of political or ideological persuasion. Admittedly corporations
are only one of many sources of wealth, and the amounts they spend on
political persuasion is not generally known; even corporate officials claim
ignorance, because political expenses are not separately accounted for.
0 3
But because endocratic corporations do have potentially enormous resources
and because they are demonstrably interested in political persuasion at the
moment, concern for limiting the use of their wealth may be justified.
A separable problem is the feeling that, whatever the absolute limit on
the amount spent, it is improper to allow it to be spent by the unrepresentative
few, the negative pregnant being that the same expenditures would be proper
if supported by the entire corporate constituency. The objection might be
articulated as a feeling that it is undemocratic to allow a few persons to mobilize
a great body of public opinion behind their personal views through the use
of wealth. It may be this view, in part, which underlies corrupt practices
legislation limiting the amount any individual or organization can contribute
to an election campaign. If public support gathered in this way is presumed
rational, however, the objection seems to evaporate. Indeed, the use of
wealth might be lauded because it facilitates the effective dissemination of
ideas among the electorate. 0 4 The premise of this objection must be, there-
fore, that public opinion can be swayed by the application of costly public
relations techniques regardless of the merits of a proposal, or that these
techniques can create an appearance of public support in the eyes of res-
ponsible officials. 0 1 This objection, however, also applies to any political or-
ganization whose members agree to pool their funds in an effort to generate
102. See generally Lucas, The Strength of Ten: Three-Quarters of a Century of
Purity in Election Finance, 51 Nw. U. L. IEv. 675 (1957) (discussing statutes).
103. QUESTIONNAIRE.
104. See Bicks & Friedman, Regulation of Federal Election Finance: A Case of Mis-
guided Morality, 28 N.Y.U.L. REv. 975 (1953).
105. See Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. v. Eastern R.R. President's Conference, 29 U.S.L.
WENEK 4191 (Sup. Ct. Feb. 20, 1961), Note, 70 YALE: L.J. 135, 147-49 (1960).
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public support. If its campaign succeeds, the real or apparent public support
created will still be disproportionate to the number of initial supporters. The
view that democratic groups will foster a more democratic process is support-
able only if one distrusts votes influenced by mass media campaigns and counts
political support only by counting votes gathered without that influence.
Rather than press this view any further, it seems wiser to conclude that the
objection against control by the few is really an objection to the techniques
one thinks they will use. This view may be especially prevalent with regard to
corporations, whose use of mass persuasion techniques is well known.
EXISTING CONTROL MECHANISMS
As the above analysis indicates, corporate political programs benefit em-
ployees, shareholders, and the public but also create serious problems affect-
ing all three groups. This section will examine the efficacy of three existing
mechanisms-corrupt practices acts, shareholder proposals, and derivative
suits-as devices to protect these various interests by limiting, in different
ways, management's unrestricted political programs.
Corrupt Practices Legislation
The Federal Corrupt Practices Act 100 and analogous statutes in thirty-six
states 1o7 are the principal legal controls over management's right to use
corporate assets for political purposes. These statutes are designed to protect
the integrity of the political process from the harmful impact of large ag-
gregates of wealth.'08 At the same time, recognizing the nonrepresentative
nature of the relationship between management and shareholders, the statutes
attempt to protect stockholders from having "their" assets used in support of
candidates or parties they might oppose.10 9
To achieve these goals, state and federal statutes prohibit corporate financial
support of political parties and candidates. These restrictions were first
106. 62 Stat. 723 (1947), 18 U.S.C. 610 (1958).
107. The state statutes are collected in THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS LEGISLATIVE REFER-
ENCE SERVICE, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON POLITICAL ACTIVITIES OF CORPORATIONS 14-52 (Aug.
4, 1958) and FORD, REGULATION OF ELECTION FINANCE Table I, (Univ. of Cal. Bureau of
Public Administration and Legislative Problems, No. 6, 1958).
108. See United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 113 (1948) ; United States v. Painters'
Local, 79 F. Supp. 516, 519 (D. Conn. 1948), rev'd on other grounds, 172 F.2d 854 (2d
Cir. 1949) ; State ex rel. La Follette v. Kohler, 200 Wis. 518, 560, 228 N.W. 895, 912
(1930) ; 65 CONG. REc. 9507-08 (1924) ; Bottomly, Corrupt Practices In Political Cam-
paigns, 30 B.U.L. REV. 331, 372 (1950).
109. See United States v. CIO, supra note 108; Hearings Before the House Commit-
tee On The Election of the President, 59th Cong. 1st Sess. 76 (1906) ; 40 CONG. REc. 96
(1906). The interest of shareholders was a factor in the common law no-contributions rule.
See People ex rel. Perldns v. Moss, 187 N.Y. 410, 439, 80 N.E. 383, 393 (1907).
Another objection to corporate participation in politics was that they lack a sense of
"individual responsibility" and are motivated solely by profit and loss considerations. State
v. Joe Must Go Club, Inc., 220 Wis. 498, 70 N.W.2d 681, 684 (1955) (dictum).
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enacted in the beginning of the twentieth century. The federal statute, the
product of public furor created by revelations of the role corporations had
played in financing the 1896 presidential campaign and fanned by President
Theodore Roosevelt, was enacted in 1907.110 The New York statute, passed
in 1906, was the result of similar pressures.' An investigation revealed that
some New York legislators had, in return for large campaign contributions
by insurance companies, been consistently protecting their interests in the state
legislature. 11 2 And evidence was adduced showing that party bosses often
exacted campaign contributions from corporations in exchange for franchises
and other governmentally dispensed privileges. 113 Similar corrupt practices
acts were subsequently passed by other states.
A typical statute provides:
No corporation whatsoever shall pay or agree to pay or contribute or
consent to contribute, directly or indirectly, any money, property or
other thing of value to any political party, organization, committee or
individual for any political purpose, whatsoever, or for the purpose of
influencing registration of any kind, to promote or defeat the candidacy
of any person for nomination, appointment or election to any political
office."14
While some of these statutes limit the prohibition to assistance to parties and
candidates, several, including the Florida statute cited above prohibit ex-
penditures for any political purpose whatever." 5 All Corrupt Practices Acts
impose criminal sanctions upon the directors and officers who authorized
the prohibited acts, typically a fine of $500 to $1,000 and jail sentences up
to one year." 6 In addition, several provide for dissolution of the corporation
or withdrawal of the right to do business within the state.117 Primary re-
sponsibility for enforcement of these criminal statutes rests with state pros-
ecuting officials. In most states, the prohibition against corporate campaign
gifts is part of a more comprehensive scheme limiting the amount that may
be contributed by one person to a candidate or political committee or ex-
110. 34 Stat. 814 (1907). For the background of the statute, see SiKEs, STATE AND
FEDERAL CoRau Pn tAcicEs LEGISLATION 188-92 (1928); United States v. UAW, 352
U.S. 567, 570-75 (1957). President Roosevelt's speeches are printed in 40 CoNG. REc. 96
(1905). See also 41 CONG. REc. 22 (1906).
11. N.Y. Sess. Laws, 1906, ch. 839, as amended, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 671 (1960 Supp.).
112. See SIKEs, op. cit. supra note 110, at 108-13.
113. Ibid.
114. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 104.091 (1960).
115. E.g., Cokx. GEN. STAT. REV. § 9-339 (1958) bars corporations from promoting
any "political party or principle." Other statutes are almost as broadly worded. E.g., N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 671 (Supp. 1960), discussed infra in note 126.
116. See e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 9-345 (1958); MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, § 229
(1957) ; MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 55, § 7 (1953).
117. See, e.g., Ky. CONST. § 150; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 211.27 (1946). In some states,
if a candidate receives aid from a corporation he forfeits his election. Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 1224 (1960).
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pended by any candidate in the course of an election."" Most states require
reports of the sources of a candidate's campaign funds and the uses to which
they were put, either as a subsitute for or a supplement to the dollar limita-
tion.119 A few states regulate the specific kinds of expenditures a candidate
may make.
120
In recent years, Corrupt Practices Acts have been subjected to increasingly
virulent attack by commentators, who have cast considerable doubt on both
assumptions which underlie these Acts: first, that legislators represent an
identifiable "public interest,"'12 and second, that they will be unable to do
so unless the sources of their campaign funds are carefully regulated.
122
Despite this criticism, however, the Corrupt Practices Acts remain as a
serious threat to developing programs of corporate political action.
In addition to prohibiting direct contributions to political parties and can-
didates, corrupt practices acts may be construed to cover corporate efforts
to stimulate popular support for governmental policies and legislation. The
first issue in construing such statutes would be whether the state law in quest-
tion applies only to attempts to influence the outcome of elections, or whether
it includes attempts to persuade legislatures and government officials as well.
Some statutes prohibit expenditures for "political purposes," while another
forbids promotion of any "measure. '"123 Verbal interpretations of "political
purpose" vary, 24 but no reported case has been found under these statutes,
involving a corporation, in which attempts to influence an election were not
at issue.' 25 Most statutes also refer to contributions to some organization,
118. See generally, FORD, op. cit. supra note 107, at 1-9.
119. See generally id. at Appendix, Table IV; Note, 40 MINN. L. REV. 156 (1956).
120. See FORD, op. cit. supra note 107, at 3-4.
121. Lucas, The Strength of Ten: Three-Quarters of a Century of Purity in Election
Finance, 51 Nw. U. L. REv. 675, 690 (1957) ; Shannon, The Political Process in Kentucky,
45 Ky. L.J. 395, 442 (1957) ("politics is the organization of hatreds").
122. Compare United States v. Painters Local, 79 F. Supp. 516, 521 (D. Conn. 1948),
rev'd on other grounds, 172 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1949), with Bicks & Friedman, Regulation of
Federal Election Finance: A Case of Misguided Morality, 28 N.Y.U.L. REV. 975, 983-84
(1953), and HEARD 36-67; 90-94; 139-41.
123. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 9-339 (1958); GA. CODE ANN. § 22-724
(1936) ; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 671. The New Hampshire and Indiana statutes forbid cor-
porate contributions to any political committee for the purpose of promoting any "measure."
N.H. Ra~v. STAT. ANN. § 70:2 (Supp. 1960); IND. STAT. ANN. § 29-5712 (1949).
124. The Wisconsin statute defines a "political purpose" as an intent to influence the
outcome of any election. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 12.01 (1960). Similarly, in Green v. Cleve-
land, 33 N.E.2d 35, 37 (Ohio App. 1940), where a city employee was denied the right to
work for a referendum proposing a city charter amendment, the court defined "political
purpose" to include all attempts to influence the outcome of an election. But many states
do not define the term. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 671; IND. STAT. ANN. § 29-5701
(1949) ; NEB. REv. STAT. ANN. § 32-1129 (1952).
125. See United States v. United States Brewers' Ass'n, 239 Fed. 163 (W.D. Pa.
1916) ; State v. Terre Haute Brewing Co., 186 Ind. 248, 115 N.E. 772 (1917) ; State v.
McCrocklin, 186 Ind. 277, 115 N.E. 929 (1917) ; People v. Gansley, 191 Mich. 357, 158
N.W. 195 (1916) ; State v. The Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co., 169 Ohio St. 42, 157 N.E.2d
331 (1959).
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often defined as a political organization. Contribution to a trade association
which engages in support of candidates or legislation might be classified as
"contribution to a political organization," depending on whether the state
law's definition of "political organization" includes groups which have other
functions which are nonpolitical. 126 "Issue" advertising published by a cor-
poration during an election campaign which directly paralleled the statements
of candidates' 2 7 or party platforms could be construed to be a contribution
of a "thing of value to [a] political party or . . . to a candidate for public
office.. . "128 The crux of this interpretation is the concept of "contribution,"
the idea that the corporation contributes by performing a service, such as
advertising, as well as by giving money. Statutes generally require that the
contribution be "to a political organization," defined variously as an or-
ganization designed to influence elections or measures. This rationale might
prohibit even independent advertising expressing views on legislative issues,
provided the state statute reaches the influencing of legislation and that the
corporation's advertisement was published to aid a "political organization"
with a similar motive. The greatest problem here would be to determine
whether the corporation's intent was to assist the political organization or
to advocate the measure itself. In the light of the constitutional problems
posed by these statutes, courts may be reluctant to permit a finding of intent
to aid the organization.
The Ohio Corrupt Practices Act proscribes corporate political issues
campaigns only if the particular issue supported or opposed is "partisan,"'12 9
and a similar gloss has been added by judicial construction to other parts of
corrupt practices legislation.' 30 The range of activities comprehended by
the word "partisan" is unclear. An issue could be said to be partisan if
126. Some definitions are ambiguous. E.g., N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 70:1 (Supp.
1960) ("any organization of two or more persons to influence elections or measures").
Quacre whether the corporation itself may not be a political committee within this defini-
tion. Other statutes have no definition. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 12.56 (1960). The
New York statute forbids the use of corporate property for any political purpose what-
soever. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 671. No "contribution" of money or services seems required to
bring corporate attempts to influence political decisions within the statute. If an intent to
influence legislation is a "political purpose," this statute may even outlaw dissemination
of management's views in stockholder reports and company newsletters. So construed, the
statute may be an unconstitutional deprivation of free speech. See United States v. CIO,
335 U.S. 106, 121 (1948) (concurring opinion) (dictum).
127. See, e.g., Hearings Before the Senate Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections
of the Committee on Rules and Administration to Investigate the 1950 Ohio Senatorial
Campaign, 82d Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 180-82, 424 (1952) ; Bicks & Friedman, supra note
122, at 995 & n.7; Mitau, Selected Aspects of Centralized and Decentralized Control Over
Campaign Finance: A Commentary on S. 636, 23 U. CL. L. REv. 620, 636 (1956).
128. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 104.091 (1960). But see Smith v. Higinbotham, 187 Md. 115,
130-31, 48 A.2d 754, 761 (1946).
129. Omffo REv. CODE ANN. § 3599.03 (1954).
130. See, e.g,, Heidtman v. City of Shaker Heights, 163 Ohio St. 109, 119 N.E.2d 644
(1954) ; Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 281 Mass. 253, 183 N.E. 495 (1932).
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national'party platforms differ on the matter. But this standard would ap-
pear irrelevant in a one-party state or in a primary election unless the party
itself is split on the issue. The meaning of "partisan" is unclear where a
particular point of view has not been included in one party's platform but
a position has been taken on the matter by the other, or both major parties
agree but are opposed by "splinter" parties. Further, the effect of statements
by party leaders, minor officials, and candidates about an issue upon its
partisan or nonpartisan character is difficult to define.
The one court which has faced these questions did not resolve them. In
State v. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Ore Corp.,'31 the Prosecuting Attorney of
Cuyahoga County brought a quo warranto action based on defendant's con-
tribution of $500 in corporate funds to a Citizens Committee For City and
County Issues, with the understanding that the funds would be used to
support several local bond issues and a home rule amendment to the Ohio
constitution. The court construed partisan political purpose to exclude "a
purpose merely to advocate the adoption of a constitutional amendment or
the passage of a bond issue or of a tax levy . . .,132 but failed to articulate
a meaningful definition of "partisan." Indeed, the court revealed a reasonable
doubt as to whether the legislature intended a broad or narrow definition,
and decided the case on the basis of the general rule of construction which
resolves doubts in interpretation of a criminal statute in favor of the de-
fendant.'
33
Corporate released-time programs under which employees continue to
receive pay while doing political tasks could also be held to violate the Cor-
rupt Practices Act. A few of these statutes specifically proscribe the con-
tribution of employee services to a political party. 34 And it is implicitly
proscribed by state statutes which prohibit the contribution of money, prop-
erty, or a thing of value to any political party, candidate, or committee. 135
The services of an employee clearly represent a "thing of value" to the cor-
poration, and to the political party. On the other hand, so long as the initiative
to participate comes from the employee, and party affiliation is not a con-
sideration in determining which efnployees may be compensated for their
political efforts, courts would probably not sustain an indictment against
the corporation. This result could be supported on grounds of benefit to the
public from increased participation throughout the political process. The nar-
131. 169 Ohio St. 42, 157 N.E.2d 331 (1959).
132. 169 Ohio St. at 45, 157 N.E.2d at 336.
133. 169 Ohio St. at 45-46, 157 N.E.2d at 334.
134. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 211.27 (1945) ; Mississippi specifically prohibits
compensation of employees for participating in primary campaigns. Miss. CODE ANN. § 3172
(1956). See also N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 70:1(V) (Supp. 1959) ("thing of value shall
not include services of volunteers who receive no pay therefor").
135. See, e.g., N.D. CENTURY CODE ANN. § 16-20-08 (1960); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
26 § 439 (1951). The federal statute appears to have been construed to the contrary. United
States v. Constr. Local, 101 F. Supp. 869 (W.D. Mo, 1951).
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row construction could be rationalized by coupling the doctrine that doubts
concerning the meaning of a criminal statute must be resolved against the
state 136 with the view that the employee, rather than the corporation, is
here making the contribution.
Even though Corrupt Practices Acts could be construed to prohibit cor-
porate political activities, it appears unlikely that they will significantly slow
the trend toward increasing corporate participation in that area. The threat
of active prosecution under these statutes is a paper tiger.1 3 7 Several factors
might be hypothesized to explain almost complete lack of enforcement. As
a tactical matter, prosecutors may be loath to institute actions because they
fear that most juries will refuse to impose criminal sanctions on important
corporations. 33 Where a corporation provides a substantial percentage of
local tax revenues and is a large employer of county citizens, its dissolution,
permitted under some statutes, may be more disastrous than its continued
political efforts. Many district attorneys, moreover, may have been elected
with the help of funds contributed directly or indirectly by corporations or
officials associated with them and would naturally be reluctant to bite the
hands that feed. And even if the Corrupt Practices Act litigation were vig-
orously pressed against corporate political action it seems likely that corpora-
tions bent on politicking could devise ways to avoid detection. As has been
noted above, corporations have purchased tickets to party fund-raising affairs
charging them to executive expense accounts as "entertainment," and have
given excess income earmarked for party contributions to employees.-39 Fi-
nally, corporations make contributions to trade or business groups or to
groups dedicated to particular legislative goals with the understanding that
these groups will, in turn, make contributions to the corporation's candidate.' 40
The Shareholder Proposal
The institution of shareholder voting has traditionally been regarded as
one device for ensuring that management administers corporate assets in
the interests of those associated with the corporation. Corrupt practices laws
also seek to protect these interests by prohibiting certain forms of corporate
136. State v. The Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co., 169 Ohio St. 42, 157 N.E.2d 331 (1959).
But not even this principle of construction could save corporations compensating Missis-
sippi employees for time spent in political primaries. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 3172 (1956).
137. See Bicks & Friedman, Regulation of Federal Election Finance: A Case of Mis-
guided Morality, 28 N.Y.U.L. REv. 975, 991 (1953) ; Compare Hearings on S. 636 Before
the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, 84th Cong. 1st
Sess. 201-03, 209-10 (1955) ; Pettengill, Regulation of Campaign Finance-The Maryland
Experience, 19 MD. L. R v. 91, 100-01 (1959).
The Cleveland-Cliffs case is the only reported instance of a post-war prosecution of an
endocratic corporation uncovered by research.
138. Cf. Pettengill, supra note 137, at 115.
139. See notes 20-24 supra and accompanying text.
140. Confidential interview with counsel for major industrial corporation.
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involvement in politics. Ideally, shareholder voting procedures would sup-
plement such legislation in two ways. If dissenting shareholders could com-
mand a majority of votes, they could provide an internal prohibition on out-
lawed political activites. If not, shareholder action might still bring the ex-
istence of political activity to the attention of the general public and create
pressures for enforcement of the act. Shareholder voting might also serve
as a valuable control when political activity does occur, whether permitted
by law or by failure of enforcement. Here it might serve, at least in part,
to legitimize the process of corporate political decision by making it more
responsive to stockholder dissatisfaction. Unfortunately, the ideal of share-
holder democracy probably cannot be realized in practice. Nevertheless, in
the forms of the voting ritual there may exist subtle controls which could
be of some value in checking management's political prerogative.
A shareholder could seek to alter company policy by mobilizing support
among security holders at an annual meeting for the policy he favors. Most
security holders do not attend annual meetings, however, and a stockholder
must therefore solicit their proxies. The expense of this solicitation would
be minimized if management would voluntarily include the shareholder pro-
posal in its own proxy statement, issued annually at company expense. But
management has usually opposed including shareholder proposals on the
corporate ballot.141 As reasons for its opposition, management has offered
the cost of printing the proposal, the liability for libelous statements which
may be incurred by the corporation, and the suggestion that many persons
who submit proposals are crackpots, publicity seekers, or pleaders for special
interests unrelated to those of the corporation.
14 2
In order to overcome management opposition, the dissident shareholder
can attempt to take advantage of the shareholder proposal provision of the
SEC proxy rules. Rule 14a-8(a), adopted by the Securities and Exchange
Commission pursuant to § 14 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934,
provides:
If any security holder entitled to vote at a meeting of security holders
of the issuer shall submit to the management of the issuer a reasonable
time before the solicitation is made a proposal which is accompanied
by notice of his intention to present the proposal for action at the meet-
ing, the management shall set forth the proposal in its proxy state-
ment ..... 148
If the shareholder's proposal is opposed by management, he can include in
141. Freeman, An Estimate of Practical Consequences of the Stockholder's Proposal
Rule, 34 U. Dzr. L.J. 549, 552 (1957).
142. Hearings on, H.R. 1493, H.R. 1821, and H.R. 2019 Before the Subcommittee of the
House Committee On Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 159 (1943).
See id. at 109-11, 119-20, 180, 182, 195; Ledes, A Review of Proper Subject Under the
Proxy Rules, 34 U. DET. L.J. 520, 523 (1957).
143. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (a) (Supp. 1960).
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the management proxy statement his name and address and a statement, not
to exceed one hundred words, in support of the proposal.14 4
Under present regulations, not all shareholder proposals fall within this
rule. The SEC's first proxy regulations, issued in 1938, implicitly required
management to include in its proxy solicitation materials all shareholder pro-
posals it knew would be presented at the annual meeting.145 When this
requirement was made explicit four years later,146 the Commission limited
its application to proposals which were proper subjects for stockholder action.
"Proper subject," the Commission later explained,' 4 7 was to be determined
by the laws of the corporation's domicile. Under the 1954 revision, a proposal
which was a proper subject for shareholder action could nevertheless be
omitted if the shareholder's purpose was to promote "general economic, po-
litical, racial, religious, social or similar causes"'148 or if the proposal recom-
mended management action concerning the "ordinary business operations"
of the company.'
49
Proper Subject. Despite its reference to state law, the "proper subject"
test has always proved difficult to apply. Presumably, the test is intended
to distinguish between those proposals which management can and cannot
rule out of order at an annual meeting, but state law on this subject is vir-
tually nonexistent. 1 0 And the subjects which may properly be acted upon
by shareholders vary with the type of action contemplated.' 51 Where a pro-
posal merely recommends a course of action to management, the few relevant
state cases indicate that it would constitute a "proper subject.' 52 Where
the action purports to bind management, the scope of shareholder initiative
is generally limited by state corporation statutes vesting the authority to
manage the business of a corporation in its Board of Directors.5 3 Even this
144. Id. at § 240.14a-8(b).
145. S.E.C. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Release No. 1823, p. 14, Aug. 11, 1943;
see Hearings, supra note 142, at 169-71.
146. S.E.C. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Release No. 3347, December 18, 1942.
147. S.E.C. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Release No. 3638, Jan. 3, 1945.
148. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c) (2) (Supp. 1960). The rule was proposed and adopted
separately in 1952. 17 Fed. Reg. 1154 (1952) ; 17 Fed. Reg. 11433 (1952).
149. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c) (5) (Supp. 1960).
150. Ledes, supra note 142, at 524; Note, 57 YALE L.J. 874, 875, 877 (1948); Bayne,
Caplin, Emerson & Latcham, Proxy Regulation And The Rule-Making Process: The
1954 Anendinents, 40 VA. L. REv. 387, 401 (1954).
151. Note, 40 VA. L. REv. 901 (1954).
152. Miller v. Vanderlip, 285 N.Y. 116, 33 N.E.2d 51 (1941) ; Whitfield v. Kern, 120
N.J. Eq. 115, 184 Atl. 333 (Ch. 1936) (dictum) ; Petit v. Cuneo, 290 Ili. App. 16, 7 N.E.2d
774 (1937) ; ef. Auer v. Dressel, 306 N.Y. 427, 118 N.E.2d 590 (1954) ; Dyer v. SEC, 266
F.2d 33, 43 (8th Cir. 1959) (dictum).
One purpose of the proxy rules was to permit shareholders to advise management on
matters of policy. See Hearings on H.R. 1493, HR. 1821 and HR. 2019 Before the Corn-
nittee On Interstate and Foreign, Commerce, 78th Cong. 1st Sess., 171 (1943).
153. Bayne, Basic Rationale of Proper Subject, 34 U. DEr. L.J. 575, 585-86 (1957)
(citing statutes) ; Note, 40 VA. L. REv. 901, 903 (1954) ; see, e.g., McQuade v. Stoneham,
263 N.Y. 323, 189 N.E. 234 (1934).
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statement is subject to qualification, however. Shareholders have been permit-
ted to compel reporting of the proceedings at annual meetings; they have
also succeeded in selecting and appointing permanent auditors to report an-
nually on the affairs of the company, even though the act of selecting a per-
manent auditor might be thought to be included within the right to manage.
54
And where shareholders are given the power to amend by-laws by statute
or charter, a proposal properly couched in the form of a by-law may become
a "proper subject," even though the same proposal cast in the form of a res-
olution binding upon management might not be.'1
The SEC appears to have ruled that a shareholder proposal requiring
management to disclose the nature and cost of political activities would not
be a "proper subject" under state law.156 This ruling seems open to question.
Under state law, a shareholder may inspect the books in order to determine
if the corporation is being properly managed. 5 7 Since political activity is
a corporate expense and may have an impact on profits, it would seem that
an individual would be permitted to ascertain the costs and objectives of
the programs. In the absence of a showing of harm to the corporation arising
154. Emerson, Some Sociological and Legal Aspects of Institutional and Individual
Participation Under the SEC's Shareholder Proposal Rule, 34 U. DET. L.J. 528, 538-39 &
nn.30, 31 (1957) (citing proposals).
155. See Note, 57 YALE L.j. 874, 878 (1948). In some states however, only the directors
are given power to amend the by-laws. Ibid.
156. Letters From SEC to George B. Driesen, SEC File No. 1-35, March 18, Sept.
30, 1960, on file in Yale Law Library. The shareholder proposal would have amended GE's
by-laws to require that:
The corporation shall include in the materials accompanying its annual proxy solici-
tations a report of the total expenses incurred in support of or in opposition to any
political candidate, any legislative proposals (whether or not submitted to popular
vote), or any political philosophy or principle. The total so reported shall include
expenditures' made directly for advertising, lobbying, propaganda, or political edu-
cation, or indirectly by contributions made to any group or association, or expended
in any other manner. The corporation shall describe in reasonable detail any legis-
lation, candidate, political program or idea for which a sum in excess of 5% of the
total amount reported was expended and shall specify the amount so spent. These
reports shall be for the twelve month period corresponding to the corporation's
fiscal year.
The company objected that the political affairs program was a matter of management's
discretion under state law, and that the proposed reporting would be unduly burdensome to
the corporation. See Letter From Gen. Elec. Co. (E. L. Hollis, Gen. Counsel) to S.E.C.,
Jan. 18, 1960, carbon on file in Yale Law Library. The SEC declined to compel General
Electric to include the proposal, accepting the company's reliance upon sub-paragraphs
(c) (1), (2) and (5) of its rules, i.e., "proper subject," "political purpose," and "ordinary
business operations." The Commission refused to indicate which of the cited sub-sections
controlled its disposition of the matter.
157. See, e.g., Guthrie v. Harkness, 199 U.S. 148 (1905). See generally BAKER &
CARY, CORPORATIONs 737-41 (3d ed. 1958).
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from public disclosure, 5 s a shareholder's resolution compelling disclosure
should be a proper means of effectuating the right to inspect.
Similarly, adoption of a by-law imposing procedural prerequisites upon
management's right to initiate political campaigns would appear to be a
proper subject for shareholder action where shareholders retain the power
by statute or charter to amend the by-laws. 15 9 And state cases sustaining
the right of shareholders to recommend a course of action falling within the
ambit of management discretion would appear to make shareholder proposals
suggesting a particular course of political conduct "proper subjects."' 60 Al-
though a proper subject, however, such resolutions would probably be barred
by the SEC's other limitations on the shareholder proposal rule.
Shareholder Purpose to Promote "Political Causes." SEC Release No.
3638,101 issued in 1945, represents the Commission's first announced attempt
to impose its own standards for determining proper subjects for shareholder
action. A shareholder presented for inclusion in management's proxy state-
ment proposals calling for elimination of double taxation of dividend income,
revision of antitrust laws, and equal legislative treatment of investors, farmers,
and workers. Management sought to omit the proposals on the ground that
they were not proper subjects for stockholder action at an annual meeting.
The Commission ruled that Rule 14a-7 (now Rulel4a-8) did not require
management to circulate the proposal. Accepting management's contention
that the corporation was "not empowered to engage in political activity," the
opinion apparently ruled that, to be a proper subject, a proposal must be
directly related to the corporation's business operations, of concern to the
shareholders as shareholders in that particular corporation. Accordingly,
the opinion concluded that proposals "to obtain the consensus of other stock-
holders with respect to matters which are of a general political, social or
economic nature" were not encompassed by the shareholder proposal rule.
In the 1951 Peck v. Greyhound Corp. decision,' 62 the Commission's reaffir-
mation of Release No. 3638 was upheld by a United States district court,
in one of the few judicial proceedings arising out of the shareholder pro-
posal rules. Peck, the holder of three shares of Greyhound stock, had sought
to have a proposal recommending that management consider the advisability
of abolishing segregated seating on its buses included in management's proxy
materials. When the Commission ruled that the proposal was not a proper
subject for shareholder action, relying on its previous release, Peck in-
stituted an action in the district court for a temporary injunction forbidding
158. The power to inspect is usually regarded as a matter of discretion with the court.
See, e.g., Guthrie v. Harkness, supra note 157, at 156 (court will "protect the interests of
all concerned").
159. Cf. Note, 57 YALE L.J. 874, 878-79 (1948) ; Slavin, Proper Subject in a Nutshell,
34 U. DET. L.J. 615, 624 (1957).
160. See authorities cited note 152 supra.
161. S.E.C. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Release No. 3638, Jan. 3,1945.
162. 97 F. Supp. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
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management from holding the annual meeting or soliciting proxies unless
his proposal was included in the solicitation materials. The court refused to
issue an injunction, in part reasoning that the expertise of the Commission
in interpreting its own rules should be respected.
The Peck case does not fall within the apparent rationale of the earlier
SEC decision; the proposal in Peck was directly related to the carrying on of
corporate business. The two decisions might be reconciled, however, if the
critical factor in both were the purpose of the shareholder in advancing the
proposal, rather than its relation to the corporation's business. In both cases,
it appeared that the shareholder was more interested in advancing his particu-
lar social and political views than he was in the interest of the corporation.
Subsequent to the Peck decision the Commission revised Rule 14a-S, ex-
plicitly adopting the "purpose" construction. As amended, the regulations
now provide that management may omit any proposal from its proxy state-
ment if "it clearly appears that the proposal is submitted by the security
holder.., primarily for the purpose of promoting general economic, political,
racial, religious, social or similar causes.1
1 6 3
Shareholder proposals to alter the objectives of corporate political cam-
paigns could probably be omitted from management proxies under this rule.
The Commission, weighing the probabilities, is likely to infer that the share-
holder is primarily concerned with the political causes he wishes the corpora-
tion to foster or oppose. But where disclosure of the costs of a political pro-
gram is proposed, the shareholder's interest would appear to be primarily re-
lated to the program's effect upon earnings and would not be excludable.
1 4
Whether the Commission would require circulation of a proposal to abolish
or make changes in employee training and released-time programs is unclear.
On its fact the proposal does not reveal the shareholder's primary purpose. A
shareholder seeking to abolish political training, for example, might be seeking
to reduce costs or attract superior personnel, in which case his purpose would
presumably be acceptable to the Commission. He might, however, be pri-
marily concerned with conflict of interest problems or the potential for coercion
contained in the program, which are essentially socio-political causes.
Arguably, the present business-in-politics movement restricts the applica-
ability of the "purpose" criterion. The apparent reason underlying the rule is
the Commission's belief that it is improper for a shareholder to disturb the
economic repose of the corporation by thrusting it into a political arena. 10
Historically, this rule was founded on the assumption that management is
not empowered to engage in political activity.16 "Empowered" or not, cor-
163. 17 C.F.R. § 210-14a-8(c) (2) (Supp. 1960), adopted in S.E.C. Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, Release 4185, November 5, 1948.
164. But see letters cited note 156 supra.
165. One commentator has stated that the restriction was designed to preclude abuses
of the rule by "persons seeking personal ends to the detriment of the corporation." Ledes,
supra note 142, at 522.
166. See text at note 161 supra.
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porations are so engaged. Proof of a shareholder's political motive, there-
fore, does not necessarily prove that he is trying to embroil the corporation
in disputes which do not presently concern it. The proposal may be made in
the context of an existing political program, and may be intended either to
restrict political activity or to direct it to other goals. At the very least, the
SEC ought to distinguish between these situations, refusing to apply the rule
when a retrenchment from politics is proposed, and possibly when the cor-
poration is already engaged in the activity dealt with by the proposal.
A more appropriate solution would be to abolish the "purpose" criterion
altogether. Administration of the rule is made difficult by the fact that
Commission decisions are often made e-x parte, 67 forcing the Commission
to surmise the shareholder's purpose from the content of his proposal. And
even if shareholder purpose were readily ascertainable, relevance of this factor
to the propriety of a stockholder resolution is questionable. The only rational
basis for the SEC's hostile attitude toward socio-political "causes" would
be a presumption that shareholder proposals motivated by political, economic,
or social considerations, are either unrelated, or are potentially detrimental,
to the ability of the corporation to earn a profit.168 Realistically, however,
the purpose of a shareholder does not determine the impact of his proposal
upon profits. Conceivably the adoption of Pecks proposal could, by attracting
additional Negro riders, have boosted Greyhound profits. Moreover, the
distinction drawn between shareholders with political, economic, and social
motives and shareholders having other motives is not found in state law.
Under that law the only prerequisite to the exercise of shareholder rights
and privileges is stock ownership.169
"Ordinary Business Operations." As amended in 1954, Rule 14a-8 further
permits management to omit any proposal which "consists of a recommenda-
tion or request that management take action with respect to a matter relating
to the conduct of the ordinary business operations of the issuer. ' 170 Un-
fortunately, as was the case with "proper subject for shareholder action"
the meaning of "ordinary business operations" in this context is unclear.
No Commission releases defining the term have been found.
The Commission has referred to state law as the basis for this rule,' 1 but
its definition and application of the rule do not bear out this claim. The rule
excludes recommendations relating to ordinary business, while state law seems
to draw the line at orders which are binding upon management. 72 Moreover,
167. See Aranow & Einhorn, Corporate Proxy Contests: Enforcement of SEC Proxy
Rules By the Commission and Private Parties, 31 N.Y.U.L. REv. 875, 885 (1956).
168. See note 165 mpra.
169. See, e.g., N.Y. STOCK CORP. LAW §§ 10, 45, 47 (1951); Rogers v. American
Tobacco Co., 143 N.Y. Misc. 306, 257 N.Y. Supp. 321, aff'd, 233 App. Div. 708, 249 N.Y.
Supp. 993 (1931).
170. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c) (5) (Supp. 1960).
171. 22 SEC ANN. REP. 103 (1956).
172. See cases cited note 152 supra,
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the few reported decisions incorporating the ordinary-business-operations
rule suggest that the Commission is using this as a catch-all concept of
omissibility. In one case, for example, this provision was invoked in respect
of a shareholder proposal that management not engage in false and mis-
leading advertising in its statements to the public and to other shareholders.
173
The Commission approved exclusion, apparently on the grounds that the
proposal implied that management had engaged in false advertising-a charge
not proved before the Commission-and that the actions sought to be pre-
vented by the proposed resolution were already forbidden by state law-in
which case the shareholder vote would be of no effect. 174 This result may,
for one or both of these reasons, make good sense. But the reference to
"ordinary business operations" seems improper. If management had not,
in fact, engaged in false advertising it is difficult to see how false advertising
could be said to be an ordinary practice of the corporation. And if management
had been falsely advertising, the existence of a state statute on the subject
should have been irrelevant for this purpose. 73 In other cases the Commission
has invoked the ordinary-business-operations test to strike down proposals
requesting more detailed annual reports, or a rule that shareholder proposals
be answered by the president or vice president within ten days. 176
This test was one of those referred to by the Commission as a basis for
allowing management to exclude a proposal for reporting of political objec-
tives and expenses. 177 Assuming that the "ordinary business operations" test is
to be applied in accordance with the common sense meaning of those words,
this result seems incorrect. Even if corporate politicking were as "ordinary"
as any other business operation, a resolution requiring reporting does not in-
terfere with management's ability to make decisions. At most, it may require
changes in accounting procedure.'
7 8
The decision to adopt or not to adopt a political affairs program would
seem to be a major policy decision, outside the "ordinary business operations"
exclusion. However, by applying the ordinary operations test in the same
manner as it is applied when economic issues are at stake, shareholder pro-
posals relating to specific political objectives would seem to be excluded once
the basic decision to institute a program had been made. But the analogy is
173. In the Matter of Union Elec. Co., S.E.C. Holding Company Act, Release No.
13,710, March 21, 1958. This case arose under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of
1935, 49 Stat. 838, 15 U.S.C. § 791(e) (1958). The Securities Exchange Act proxy regu-
lations apply to solicitations under § 12(e). Holding Company Act Release No. 13,710
supra.
174. Ibid. See also In the Matter of Union Elec. Co., S.E.C. Holding Company Act
Release No. 13,450, April 17, 1957.
175. Compare Dyer v. SEC, 266 F.2d 33,46 (8th Cir. 1959).
176. See proposals #10, #28, #30 tabulated in Bayne, mupra note 153, at 609-12.
177. See letter cited note 156 .rpra.
178. Some separate accounting may be necessary even without such a requirement, due
to the nondeductibility of certain political expenses for federal tax purposes. See generally
Comment, 69 YALE L.J. 1017 (1960).
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improper. Management's expertise in business affairs cannot support the same
degree of absolute authority when applied to political questions, particularly
when issues not intimately affecting company operations are involved.
The Shareholder Vote and the Endocratic Corporation
The Commission's retreat from the initial broad scope of the shareholder
proposal regulation probably reflects disenchantment with its earlier con-
ception of the stockholder function. The original rule was predicated on the
assumption that stockholders take an active interest in the affairs of their
company and that their concern would be reflected in proposals beneficial to
its operation and likely to command support from interested security hold-
ers.17 0 In fact, however, few are sufficiently concerned with company affairs to
make proposals, support them with convincing arguments if the company
seeks to omit them, and appear at the annual meeting to urge their adoption.
Dissatisfied shareholders in endocratic corporations sell their securities rather
than fight management.' s0
Research has failed to uncover a single shareholder proposal that has been
adopted over the opposition of the management of an endocratic corporation.
Indeed, stockholders taking advantage of section 14-A-8 have had difficulty
mustering more than 10% of the votes cast at an annual meeting.' 8 ' Man-
agement's ability to defeat any shareholder proposal stems in part from the
practice of fiduciaries and institutional holders always to vote their proxies
as requested by management, and in part from the tendency of the average
shareholder, if he votes at all, to support management as a matter of course.
8 2
In addition, a majority of individual owners holding stock in "street" name
fail to designate the manner in which they wish proxies to be voted, thereby
permitting banks and brokerage houses to vote in favor of incumbents. 8 3
These considerations suggest that the shareholder proposal rule does not make
the shareholder vote an effective instrument for modifying the policies of
endocratic corporations.
But the existence of the rule may nevertheless serve a useful purpose, by
attracting attention to existing policies and imposing upon management the
necessity for careful consideration of shareholder proposals. By proposing a
change in management's policy, a shareholder attracts attention to it. Not
only do other shareholders learn about possible objections to existing policy,
179. See 13 SEC ANN. REP. 41 (1947); 78 CoNG. REc. 7861, 7862, 7864 (1934);
Note, 47 Nw. U.L. REv. 718 (1952) ; Bayne, supra note 153, at 576-80.
180. See LMNGSTON, THE AmERrCAN STOCKHOLDER 134 (1958). See generally Slavin,
supra note 159, at 616.
181. See Bayne, Caplin, Emerson & Latcham, Proxy Regulation and the Rule-Making
Process: The 1954 Amendments, 40 VA. L. REv. 387 (1954).
182. See BERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 30-31 (1954).
183. Freeman, An Estimate of the Practical Consequences of the Stockholder's Pro-
posal Rule, 34 U. DEr. LJ. 549, 553 (1957).
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but, through newspaper accounts of stockholder meetings, the dispute may
also be brought to the attention of a wider public.'8 4 Publicity is distasteful to
most executives, who fear criticism even by those unable to translate their
objections into remedial action. L8 5 This sensitivity may stem in part from a
fear of public opinion which, if aroused, may lead to legislative restraints' 80
The fear of public opinion may be a particularly strong force when corporate
political activities are involved, because political controversies would seem to
interest a wider public than mundane business struggleg. In furtherance of
its desire to forestall criticism, management wil tend to avoid actions which
might induce shareholders to suggest policy changes.
A second function of the shareholder proposal is to force management care-
fully to consider a suggested change and to review its policy in the light of the
implied criticism.187 The shareholder proposal is similar to, but more effective
than, a letter from a customer, supplier, employee, or stockholder to manage-
ment. It is highly unlikely that the contents of a letter will be brought to the
attention of many top executives, but a proposal inevitably comes to the atten-
tion of a large number of responsible persons. If the proposal is included in the
proxy material pursuant to the rule, most corporate officers will see it. If the
corporation intends to exclude the proposal, corporate counsel will have to
examine it and present objections to the SEC. And at least one member of
management will have to be prepared to debate the proposal with the share-
holder at the annual meeting. Thus the shareholder proposal will serve to
communicate some opposing views to management and, at least to this extent,
will make the program adopted more representative of the corporate constit-
uency.
The Shareholder Derivative Suit
To the extent that shareholder derivative suits can successfully be used to
challenge management's political activity, they may serve to protect several
184. Shareholder meetings are sometimes reported in newspapers of general circulation.
See, e.g., N.Y. Times, April 21, 1960, p. 41, col. 4 (A.T.&T.) ; id., April 27, 1960, p. 49, col.
5 (W.T. Grant) ; id., April 28, 1960, p. 219, col. 6 (General Electric).
The "wider public" may include institutional investors who can exercise control over
management policy if they desire to do so. See BERLE, POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY 48-50
(1959) ; LIVINGSTON, THE AMERICAN STOCKIHOLDER 163 (1958).
185. See BERLa, op. cit. mpra note 184, at 109-10. See generally BERLE, THE 20TH
CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 74-77 (1954). See also LrvINGsTON, op. Cit. mpra note
184, at 197, 204 (disclosure forces management to observe higher ethical standards).
The president of the Prudential Insurance Co. resigned in the face of stockholder criti-
cism of legally acceptable transactions between him and the company despite the probability
that he had not damaged the corporation. N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 1960J, p. 61, col. 2; id.,
December 24, 1960, p. 49, col. 5.
186. See BERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 54-65, 113-15 (1954).
The dormant power of institutional shareowners to replace incumbents may be another
source of management restraint. LmGSTON, op. cit. supra note 184, at 163. But see BERLE,
op. cit. m.pra at 36.
187. Freeman, supra note 183, at 554-55.
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interests. At one level, the derivative suit protects the economic interests of
shareholders from depredation by corporate officials using the company's
assets to propagate their own ideas. The threat of a derivative suit may also
compel management to consider shareholder reaction to its selection of polit-
ical goals, as well as the community reaction which might be reflected in
judicial response. Finally, the shareholder litigant, whatever his own motives,
may serve as a tool of state policy protecting the political process. The cat-
egories of proper and improper management action-the causes of action for
shareholder-may be moulded by considerations of public policy reaching be-
yond the immediate confines of the corporation. Public goals will also be
served by the probability that plaintiffs will not sue unless political spending
reaches noticeable proportions, a consideration which may induce management
to keep spending to a minimum and thus reduce the impact of corporate wealth
on politics. Both substantive and procedural obstacles, however, raise some
doubt about the utility of the shareholder suit in this area.
The derivative suit is an action instituted by a shareholder on behalf of the
corporation to assert a claim which the corporation has against insiders or
third parties. Unless a majority of the directors are themselves defendants in
the suit, a request that the Board institute legal proceedings to have the claim
asserted is usually a prerequisite. 8 In many instances, the plaintiff-share-
holder is further required to demonstrate that he has attempted to initiate
stockholder action.' 8 9 Although damages are payable to the corporation, the
plaintiff-stockholder is entitled, if successful, to charge his counsel fees
and expenses against the recovery.'90 Where relief other than damages is
sought, the shareholder may nevertheless be reimbursed by the corporation
if it has received a tangible benefit.' 91
A derivative suit attacking a corporation's political program might be based
on the theory that these programs, not being authorized by charter, or statute,
are ultra vires. The channeling of corporate assets into politics would con-
stitute waste for which directors and officers would have to account to the
corporation.
92
Traditionally, the law viewed corporations as legal entities authorized to
exercise those powers granted by the state in order to achieve charter pur-
poses.1 3 Powers may be granted expressly by charter or statute or by implica-
tion when found necessary or convenient to achieve stated purposes. If a cor-
poration acts beyond its powers, it is said to be acting ultra vires. The clas-
sical example of ultra vires would be the operation of a steamboat by a cor-
188. LATTix, CoRpoRATIoNs 352 (1959).
189. Ibid.
190. Id. at 381.i
191. See, e.g., Kaufman v. Shoenberg, 33 Del. Ch. 282, 92 A.2d 295 (Ch. 1952) ; Dot-
tenheim v. Emerson Elec. Mfg. Co., 77 F. Supp. 306 (E.D.N.Y. 1948).
192. See Ham, Ultra Vires Contracts Under Modern Corporate Legislation, 46 Ky.
L.J. 215, 231-32 (1958) (citing statutes).
193. See generally BAKz_ & CARY, CORPOATIONS §§ 58-73 (3d ed. 1958).
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poration chartered to run a railroad. In recent years statutes have considerably
broadened corporate powers' 94 and courts have tended to permit corporations
to exercise virtually any power not expressly prohibited so long as they
find that the acts done "benefitted" the corporation.195 If corporate benefit
alone were the standard, political expenditures would easily avoid charges
of ultra vires. The benefit of campaigns relating to legislation having an im-
mediate effect on industry profits seems obvious. Political activity of a more
general nature, such as the propagation of political ideals friendly to corporate
enterprise, employee political training, and released-time programs, might
also qualify under the more attenuated concept of "benefit to the corporation"
used to sustain corporate charitable contributions. A leading case in the char-
itable contributions area reasoned that a corporation would benefit from
donations to a community church, because a better community would draw
better workers. 196
The few cases mentioning the propriety of political expenditures, however,
all concluded that such action would be ultra vires. 197 In at least one case,
management explicitly sought to justify the political activity, campaign con-
tributions, on grounds of its benefit to the corporation. 198 In another, the court
considered political and charitable contributions separately in passing upon
expenses to determine a public utility's rate schedule; it concluded that while
charitable donations were probably proper corporate expenses, political ex-
penditures were "personal" and not allowable. 199 The wording of judicial
statements suggests that they may be based on a myopic view of political
194. For example, many statutes now authorize corporations to make charitable con-
tributions. Some have no explicit requirement of corporate benefit. See, e.g., CAL. CORP.
CODE AN. § 8 02(g); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-16(10) (1958); Ky. REV. STAT.
§ 271.125 (13) (1955). Others explicitly retain the corporate benefit rule, however, see, e.g.,
N.Y. GEN. CORP. LAws § 34; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18:1-.19(11), and it may be argued
that the benefit requirement survives the statutes. See Memorial Hospital Ass'n v. Pacific
Grape Prod. Co., 45 Cal. 2d 634, 290 P.2d 481 (1955) ; Union Pac. R.R. v. Trustees, Inc.,
8 Utah 2d 101, 329 P.2d 398 (1954) ; Moore v. Keystone Macaroni Mfg. Co., 370 Pa. 172,
87 A.2d 295 (1952). Some states key their charitable contributions statutes to the Internal
Revenue Code. See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-211(b) (1960). Corporations in these
states could not rely upon these statutes to validate political activities. See Commarano v.
United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959).
195. See BAKER & CARY, op. cit. supra note 193, at 358, 366; A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v.
Barlow, 13 N.J. 145, 98 A.2d 581, appeal dismissed, 346 U.S. 861 (1953) ; Hutton v. Vest
Cork Ry. Co., [1883] 23 L.R. (Ch.) 654, 673.
196. Steinway v. Steinway & Sons, 17 Misc. 43, 40 N.Y. Supp. 718 (Sup. Ct. 1896).
See generally Note, 8 RUTGERS L. REv. 527 (1954).
197. Mobile Gas Co. v. Patterson, 293 Fed. 208, 226 (M.D. Ala. 1923) (campaign con-
tributions are personal expenditures of officers for rate-making purposes) ; McConnell v.
Combination Min. & Mill. Co., 31 Mont. 563, 79 Pac. 248 (1905) (expenses incurred in
lobbying for passage of a bill charged to directors as beyond corporate purposes) ; People
ex rel. Perkins v. Moss, 187 N.Y. 410, 439, 80 N.E. 383, 386-89 (1907) (dictum) (larceny
prosecution for contributing corporate funds to political party).
198. People ex rel. Perkins v. Moss, 187 N.Y. 410, 439, 80 N.E. 383, 385 (1907).
199. Mobile Gas Co. v.- Patterson, 293 Fed. 208, 226 (M.D. Ala. 1923).
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activity as an end in itself, and, as such, ultra vires for not being listed as one
of the corporate purposes in the charter.200 More likely, however, the courts
were saying that certain acts, regardless of their probable effect, were simply
foreign to the conceptual image of what a corporation was and what it could
do. Allied with this notion in one of the cases is the suggestion that corporate
political involvement was against public policy.201 The cases in question were
decided before 1925, during and shortly after the era in which the corruption
of contemporary corporate politicking was exposed and assaulted by a wave
of corrupt practices legislation. The ultra vires notion may have been, at
least in part, the product of this reform movement.
The present authority of these early cases is questionable. None gave ex-
tended consideration to the problem. Furthermore, the conceptual view of the
corporation as nonpolitical, by its nature, seems irrelevant today. And it no
longer seems necessary to equate corporate politics with bribery. This does not
mean that public policy might not be offended in other ways; the unrepresent-
ative nature of political decision making in the endocratic corporation still
constitutes an encroachment on fundamental values. But even this important
shortcoming must be balanced against the corporation's problem of competing
in a business world often dominated by governmental regulation. The use of
the ultra vires doctrine may further be hampered by the general disfavor with
which the doctrine has been viewed in recent years. Commentators have in-
sisted that engrafting public policy notions on the ultra vires doctrine does
violence to that concept.2 0 2 Courts may hesitate to employ the doctrine despite
the fact that criticism has rested primarily on the harm done to third parties
dealing in good faith with the corporation, whose contracts can be voided by
the finding of ultra vires 20 3 -a problem not immediately apparent when share-
holders sue directors for waste, or to enjoin a political program.
Although it is probably impossible to speak of political activity as per se
ultra vires,2 0 4 the challenge may be effective against campaigns which are of
200. E.g., McConnell v. Combination Min. & Mill. Co., 31 Mont. 563, 571, 79 Pac. 248,
251 (1905) ("a purpose wholly foreign to those of a mining corporation").
201. People ex rel. Perkins v. Moss, 187 N.Y. 410, 80 N.E. 383, 388 (1907) (dictum)
(concurring opinion). Occasionally courts will invoke the concept of ultra vires to in-
validate a transaction which, although not specifically prohibited, seems offensive on public
policy grounds. See, e.g., Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Pottoroff, 291 U.S. 245 (1934) (Brandeis,
J.) ; Awotin v. Atlas Exchange Nat'l Bank, 275 Il1. App. 530 (1934), aff'd, 295 U.S. 209
(1935) ; McWilliams v. Central States Life Ins. Co., 137 S.W.2d 641, 646 (Mo. Ct. App.
1940). See also National Inv. Co. v. National Say., Loan & Bldg. Ass'n, 49 Minn. 517, 52
N.W. 138 (1892) (prohibited transaction beyond "powers").
202. E.g., BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 92 (1946).
203. See Ballantine, Proposed Revision of the Ultra Vires Doctrine, 12 CORNELL L.Q.
453 (1927).
204. It might be argued that some of the explicit exceptions to state corrupt practices
laws dealing with corporations constitute implicit legislative recognition that some forms
of political activity are proper corporate activities. See, e.g., MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 55,
§ 7 (1953) (excepting political activity affecting corporate property) ; Wis. STAT. ANN.
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remote benefit to the corporation. The extension of the benefit concept in the
charitable contributions cases appears to have been based upon another public
policy concept, the view that corporations as holders of large wealth must be
allowed to contribute if charities are to function effectively in the age of de-
clining private fortunes s.2 5 This rationale of necessity does not apply to pol-
itical activities; the corporation's views and training activities, while often
valuable, do not seem essential to the political process. Apparently in accord
with this view, one state attorney general has ruled that statutes authorizing
charitable gifts do not authorize political support by savings and loan assoc-
iations on ballot propositions "unless the proposition is found to be 'necessary
and convenient' to the advancement of the 'purposes' for which these associa-
tions were formed. '20 6 The charitable contribution cases would support non-
profit making political expenditures only if they are read to hold that any
activity which is intended to promote the national welfare is intra vires.
Other causes of action might be available. The New York Court of Appeals
in Abrains v. Allen 0 7 has held that an allegation charging use of corporate
assets to promote an official's personal view states a cause of action for waste,
mismanagement, lack of due care, or conversion-"depending on circum-
stances." Separation of personal views from those propounded for the benefit
of the corporation would, of course, be difficult. If the magnitude of the ex-
pense incurred were substantial, however, and the relationship to corporate
profits remote, the plaintiff might argue that this amount of evidence estab-
lishes a prima facie case of wasting corporate assets which shifts the burden to
defendants to prove good faith.2D8
§ 12.56(b) (Supp. 1960) (excepting dissemination through company organs of views about
effect of measures and candidates on corporation). See Smith v. Higinbotham, 187 Md.
115, 48 A.2d 754 (1946) ; La Belle v. Hennepin County Bar Ass'n, 206 Minn. 290, 288
N.W. 788 (1939). Quaere the reverse inference that activity prohibited is ultra vires.
205. See, e.g., A. P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 13 N.J. 145, 149-54, 98 A.2d 581, 584,
585-86, appeal dismissed, 346 U.S. 861 (1953); accord, Union Pac. R.R. v. Trustees, Inc.,
8 Utah 2d 101, 105, 329 P.2d 398, 400 (1958); Note, 22 GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 710 (1954).
206. Opinion Letter to the Savings and Loan Commissioner, California Attorney Gen-
eral, October 14, 1960, p. 2 (alternative ground). The political issue involved a proposed
issue of state water bonds. The Attorney General argued that the intent of the legislature
in passing the statute was to broaden the power of corporations to enable them to make
gifts to charitable instrumentalities. But the term "public welfare," used in these statutes,
does not extend to political causes, the attorney general ruled. Ibid. Compare Clark, The
Limitation On Political Activities: A Discordant Note in the Law of Charities, 46 VA.
L. REv. 439 (1960) (political influence and activity essential to realize goals of many
charities). The Attorney General relied, in part, upon the distinction drawn in the early
cases between philanthropies benefiting the corporation, permitted at common law, and
political contributions, which were forbidden.
207. 297 N.Y. 52, 74 N.E.2d 305 (1947). On remand plaintiff was unable to prove that
defendant's actions were motivated solely by an intent to defeat unionization. Abrams v.
Allen, 113 N.Y.S.2d 181 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
208. The argument would be based on analogy to the rule in some jurisdictions that
directors have the burden of proving that their contracts with the corporation were made
in good faith and were inherently fair. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939) ; Geddes
v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590, 599 (1921).
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The court in Abrams v. Allen also ruled that use of corporate assets to do
an unlawful act would constitute a cause of action.20 9 This raises the issue of
the inter-relationship between corrupt practices acts and the shareholder suit.
Whatever the scope of the Abrams holding,210 it seems peculiarly applicable to
violations of the corrupt practices acts by corporate officers. The shareholder
here would not merely be suing to prevent some abstract "public wrong."
Although corrupt practices legislation is criminal, it usually had as one of its
purposes to prevent the use of corporate assets to support political positions
some stockholders might oppose. 211 The action might further be supported by
analogy to the private actions which have been allowed under the criminal
sections of federal securities legislation..
2 12
The uncertain scope of any of these causes of action makes forecasting the
probability of success in a stockholder derivative action difficult and thereby
discourages such litigation. But even if the political activity in issue were
clearly actionable, "death knell" statutes in force in most commercial jurisdic-
tions have virtually precluded use of derivative suits. Section 61(b) of the
New York Corporation Law is typical. It requires a plaintiff who owns less
than five per cent of the corporation's outstanding stock, or less than a stated
market value, to post security for the legal expenses incurred by the cor-
poration and the individual defendants.213 This financial requirement is usually
more than plaintiff can bear.
214
Under some circumstances, it might be possible to bypass the discouraging
effect of a death knell statute. Plaintiff could, for example, shop for a forum
which does not have such a statute.2 1' The substantive issue in the derivative
action, whether political activities are actionable, must be determined by the
209. 297 N.Y. at 56, 74 N.E.2d at 306.
210. For discussion of the possible ramifications of this doctrine, see Note, 57 YAie
L.J. 489 (1948).
211. See note 109 supra and accompanying text. Where the legislative history of a
criminal statute demonstrates that its interest was to protect a particular class while achiev-
ing a public benefit, courts will afford a civil remedy to members of the class. Remar v.
Clayton Sec. Corp., 81 F. Supp. 1014 (D. Mass. 1949) (Wyzanski, J.). And where, as
here, see text at notes 137-40 supra, the public remedy has proven inadequate, courts fol-
lowing common law principles may provide civil remedies. See Tunstall v. Brotherhood of
Locomotive Firemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944) (injunction). But not all criminal statutes
apparently protecting individuals give rise to civil remedies. See, e.g., Bell v. Faulkiner, 75
S.W.2d 612 (Mo. Ct. App. 1934) (statute forbidding interference with employees' right
to vote).
212. See Loss, The SEC Proxy Rules in the Courts, 73 HARv. L. Rev. 1041 (1960);
Note, 59 YALE L.J. 1120, 1133-35 (1950) ; 37 A.L.R.2d 649 (1954) (Annot.).
213. N.Y. GEN.- CoRP. LAw § 61(b); Note, 52 COLUm. L. REV. 267 (1952); Note,
1956 Wis. L. Rev. 322.
214. See Hornstein, New Aspects of Stockholders' Derivative Suits, 47 CoLum. L.
REv. 1, 5 (1947) ; Hornstein, The Death Knell of Stockholders' Derivative Suits int New
York, 32 CALiF. L. REv. 123 (1944).
215. See Berkwitz v. Humphrey, 130 F. Supp. 142 (N.D. Ohio 1955).
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law of the corporation's domicile.2 1 6 But the security-for-expenses aspect
of the derivative action is procedural for conflicts of law purposes, and is there-
fore governed by the law of the forum.2 -1 7 In the alternative, plaintiff might
bring a personal action, to which the security-for-expenses statutes do not
apply.218 In such an action, however, his remedy is restricted to an injunction
against future political activities. 219 Damages will not be awarded unless
plaintiff can establish a relationship to defendant directors other than that
based on share ownership.
220
THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION
Two of the controls this Comment has considered, shareholder derivative
suits and corrupt practices acts, raise questions concerning the constitutional
protection of freedom of speech. Corrupt practices acts, construed to prevent
a corporation from expressing its views to the public, and decrees issued in
shareholder suits would limit the right to speak freely-if that right is avail-
able to corporations.
Initially, corporations were held not to be entitled to exercise the liberties
of speech and press accorded to natural persons.221 Despite reliance on this
doctrine by some lower courts in recent years,222 the distinction between
natural and artificial persons appears to have been weakened by later decisions
-not all explicitly considering the corporate character of the claimant. In-
216. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 187-89 (1934); CHEATHAM, GOODRICH,
GRISWOLD & REESE, CASES ON CONFLICT OF LAWS 988 (1957).
217. Berkwitz v. Humphrey, 130 F. Supp. 142 (N.D. Ohio 1955). See Cohen v. Bene-
ficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
218. The state statutes apply only to plaintiffs suing in the right of the corporation.
See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. CORP. LAW § 61(b) ; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180-405(4) (1957) ; N.J.
STAT. ANN. 14:3-15 (Supp. 1960).
For the distinction between derivative and personal actions, see LATTIN, CORPORATIONS
346-48 (1959).
219. See id. at 348; Glenn, The Stockholder's Suit-Corporate and Individual Griev-
ances, 33 YALE L.J. 580, 584 (1924) ; Note, 40 CALIF. L. REv. 127, 129 (1952) ; General
Inv. Co. v. Lake Shore & M.S. Ry., 250 Fed. 160 (6th Cir. 1918) (dictum), aff'd, 260
U.S. 261 (1922).
220. Dickinson v. Consolidated Traction Co., 114 Fed. 322 (C.C.D.N.J. 1902) (dictum);
Elster v. American Airlines, Inc., 34 Del. Ch. 94, 100 A.2d 219 (1953). The shareholder
may be able to recover his expenses, however. See LATTiN, CORPO0RATONS 381 (1959);
Holthusen v. Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co., 55 F. Supp. 945 (E.D. Pa. 1944).
221. Hague v. Committee for Indus. Organization, 307 U.S. 496, 514, 527 (1939);
Comment, 66 YALE L.J. 545, 547-50 (1957) ; accord, People v. Gansley, 191 Mich. 357,
376,158 N.W. 195, 201 (1916) ; see Northern Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243
(1906) ; Western Turf Ass'n v. Greenberg, 204 U.S. 359 (1907) ; Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
222. Hallmark Productions v. Moseley, 190 F.2d 904, 909 (8th Cir. 1951) (dictum);
Joint Anti-Facist Refugee Committee v. Clark, 177 F.2d 79, 83 (D.C. Cir. 1949), rev'd on
other grounds, 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
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corporated motion picture companies 223 and newspapers 224 have successfully
invoked constitutional freedoms of speech and press in resisting state tax and
censorship statutes. In only one of these cases, Grosjean v. American Press Co.,
was the applicability of the amendment to a corporation challenged, and there
the court summarily disposed of the issue in the corporation's favor. 2 5 A sec-
ond line of cases in which the issue arose involved restrictions under the
National Labor Relations Act upon allegedly coercive anti-union speech by
corporate employers. In these cases, lower courts have assumed that the first
amendment limited the restraints the NLRB might impose; here again the
corporate nature of the employer was not considered.226 The Supreme Court
was able to dispose of these cases without invoking the corporate employer's
freedom of speech. 22 7 But in NAACP v. Alabama,228 the Court was presented
with a New York membership corporation's claim to first amendment rights,
and refused to decide the case on that basis. Rather, it sustained the NAACP's
refusal to produce membership lists on the ground that it was asserting the
rights of its members-something it was entitled to do because "it and its
members are in every practical sense identical." 229 This case suggests that
the first amendment rights of corporations are derivative and not available
to the legal entity as such. A final comment on this development is an unex-
plained distinction implied by a dictum of Mr. Justice Reed:
If § 313 [of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act] were construed to pro-
hibit publication, by corporations ... in the regular course of conducting
their affairs, of periodicals advising their ... stockholders or customers of
danger or advantage to their interests from the adoption of measures, or
the election to office of men espousing such measures, the gravest doubt
would arise in our minds as to its constitutionality. 230
Even though these cases indicate that the right of free speech may be avail-
able to some corporate defendants, the paucity of authority makes accurate
determination of that right difficult. The main problem, assuming the existence
223. Superior Films, Inc. v. Dep't of Education, 346 U.S. 587 .(1954) (film censor-
ship) ; Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952) ; Adams Newark Theatre Co.
v. City of Newark, 39 N.J. Super. 111, 120 A.2d 496 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1956).
224. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936). See also Pennekamp v.
Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946) (newspaper corporation's comment on trial not punishible
as contempt) ; Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941) (semble).
225. 297 U.S. at 244.
226. NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 157 F.2d 486, 498-99 (8th Cir. 1946) ; NLRB
v. Ford Motor Co., 114 F.2d 905 (6th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 689 (1941).
227. See NLRB v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469, 477 (1941). The case
was cited as granting first amendment protection in Thomas v. Collins, 323 -U.S. 516, -537
(1945) (Rutledge, J.).
228. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
229. 357 U.S. at 459.
230. United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 121 (1948) (dictum). See also Cammarano
v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 514-15 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring) (profit corpora-
tion has right of free speech).
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of the right, is to identify when it is that "the corporation" is speaking. If
the corporation's right is based upon the right of its members to use the
corporate medium to express their views, an inquiry into the relationship
between members and the corporate speech might be in order. This inquiry
might take the form suggested in the NAACP case, an inquiry into the
"identity" of members and organization. The statement of Mr. Justice Reed
might give content to this formula, suggesting that protected speech is com-
munication affecting the "interests" of shareholders or customers-presumably
their interest in the continued prosperity of the corporation.23 ' Unfortunately,
an "interest" criterion alone has little meaning, especially in the context of
political activity. Narrowly construed, it would protect communication of
management's views concerning the impact of any proposed or actual gov-
ermental action which related to any present activity of the corporation's
employees or officers. On the other hand, if expanded notions of the ambit of
corporate responsibility become accepted as in the law governing corporate
contributions to charity, speech concerning any question of public policy could
be protected from state and federal regulation.
Another approach to the problem of defining "corporate" speech might
begin by asking whether the officer speaking has been "authorized" to speak
by the corporation. The corporation's right of free speech is of significance in
the political context because it permits appropriation of company assets for
the purpose of propagating ideas. In ordinary corporate transactions, the
authority of an officer to use corporate assets is determined by state law.
2 32
While a federal right is being defined in this case, state law must to some de-
gree be the referent of the corporate action which the Supreme Court may
declare protected.
The concept of authority involves two determinations. First, if state law
forbids corporations to speak on political matters, an officer's political speech
would not be authorized. This element of the authority concept cannot be
relevant, for a constitutional right to speak, by definition, would preclude
states from imposing this kind of limitation. The second element of authority
is the grant of powers and stated purposes contained in the charter.33 The
231. The statement by Mr. Justice Reed was concerned only with communications
to shareholders and customers. And the labor cases have dealt only with employees. One
state has apparently adopted the view that communications to persons outside these groups
are not protected. See Wis. STAT. ANN\. § 12.56(b) (1957). But such a limitation makes
little sense. It is inconsistent with one purpose of first amendment protection-to maintain
a "market place of ideas." See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes,
J., dissenting). See also Richardson, Freed'om of Expression and the Function of Courts,
65 HARV. L. REv. 1, 3-4 (1951). To maximize that value, the corporation should be able
to speak to an unrestricted audience. Perhaps Mr. Justice Douglas thought that the cor-
poration itself had no right of free speech, but that the right of shareholders and customers
to protect their interests by exercising ordinary political rights demands that some chan-
nel of communication between them and management be kept open.
232. See St. Louis, V. & T.H.R.R. v. Terre Haute & I.R.R., 145 U.S. 393 (1892). See
also Hopkins Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Cleary, 296 U.S. 315 (1935).
233. See BAKER & CARY, CORPORATIONs 359 & n.6 (3d ed. 1958).
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charter authorization gives some indication of the interests which identify the
organization and its members. It may give notice to stockholders of the cor-
poration's purposes, and places some power in their hands to change or at
least to resist changes in that purpose. This meaning of authorization seems
relevant to the constitutional question. It focuses on the nexus between the
speech and the individuals on whose behalf protection of the organization's
right seems most justifiable.
The second element of authorization is precisely what the ultra vires
derivative suit seeks to determine. If the use of corporate assets for political
"speaking" is found ultra vires, its prohibition does not trangress the cor-
poration's right to free speech. The activity is not speech of or for the cor-
poration. A similar conclusion would follow if the speech was prohibited under
the Abrams v. Allen theory-that it represented a personal view and not the
view of the corporation.2 4 The cause of action rests on the appropriation of
corporate assets for personal use; the fact that speech was the motive seems
irrelevant.
The significance of corrupt practices acts in defining corporate free speech
is unclear. On the one hand, the stated purpose of protecting shareholders
from having their assets used for purposes contrary to their own beliefs 235
sounds like a generalized conclusion that shareholders do not authorize use
of their assets for electioneering. Arguably, therefore, all expenditures pro-
scribed by the act do not come within the protection of corporate speech, be-
cause they are noncorporate. But the generalized application of this presumed
lack of authorization would seem arbitrary in many cases, particularly where
the corporation is a nonprofit organization expressly devoted to political
action. State courts have avoided this issue in most cases by deciding that the
act did not apply to such organizations, reasoning that corrupt practices
legislation was intended to reach business corporations whose large accumula-
tions of wealth were a threat to the political process.2 6 While this rationale
avoids one problem, it raises another. It reveals that the major purpose of
these acts has nothing to do with shareholder authorization. Rather, the
legislation represents a statement of policy that corporate political participation
is harmful to the public. This policy must be regarded as a restraint on cor-
porate speech, and must, therefore, be judged under constitutional standards
pertaining to free speech. The same conclusion would apply with even greater
certainty in the case of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, for the purpose of
defining shareholder authorization would seem foreclosed to a federal leg-
lature.
If, under either approach, the activity challenged can be categorized *as' cor-
porate speech, all governmental regulation is not necessarily precluded. First
234. 297 N.Y. 52, 74 N.E.2d 305 (1947).
235. See note 109 mipra.
236. Smith v. Higinbotham, 187 Md. 115, 48 A.2d 754 (1946); La Belle v. Hennepin
County Bar Ass'n, 206 Minn. 290, 288 N.W. 788 (1939) ; State v. Joe Must Go Club of
Wisconsin, Inc., 270 Wis. 108, 70 N.W.2d 681 (1955).
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amendment protections are not absolute; where a legitimate state interest is
threatened, reasonable regulation is permitted.23 7 Arguably, the state has an
interest in maintaining a "market place of ideas." 2 8 The danger is that cor-
porate managers, given enormous resources at their command, could effective-
ly flood the market place and thus stifle any genuine attempt at effective de-
bate.239 This theory might sustain imposition of dollar limitations on the
amount of corporate assets--cash, services of employees, and equipment-
which management may devote to the dissemination of its ideas.
2 40
CONCLUSION
The novelty of corporate political affairs programs argues against the
application of more stringent legal controls before there is an opportunity to
examine their actual effect upon shareholders, managerial personnel, hourly
rated employees, and the public. Possibly, corporate managers will set up in-
ternal mechanisms to protect employees from overzealous superiors. It may
also be that the volume of resources committed to these programs will not be
great enough to warrant concern for shareholder interests, and corporate
persuasion programs may simply add another competing voice to the clamor
for public political allegiance. But so long as corporate managements do not
account separately for the costs of their political activities and do not disclose
their efforts in detail 241 neither legislators, courts, nor shareholders can be
237. Times Film Corporation v. Chicago, 29 U.S.L. WEEK 4120 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 23,
1961) ; Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) ; Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 463
(1907) ; Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897).
238. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting);
see Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S.
353, 365 (1937).
239. Cf. United States v. Painters' Local, 79 F. Supp. 516, 521-23 (D. Conn. 1948),
reversed on other grounds, 172 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1949) ; United States v. United States
Brewers' Ass'n, 239 Fed. 163, 168 (W.D. Pa. 1916) ; Note, 27 FoRDHAM L. REv. 599, 609
(1959). Compare MEIKLEJOHN, FREEDOM OF SPEECH 75 (1960). For an example of cor-
porate managers translating economic into political power, see Salisbury, N.Y. Times, April
13, 1960, p. 33, cols. 3-4.
Congress recognized that the ability to communicate one's ideas without cost to one-
self. could create an unfair political advantage. CONFLICT OF INTEREST 54-55 (franking
privi lege denied "dollar-a-year" men).
If corporate persuasion campaigns were too successful, they could diminish the possi-
bility of securing legislation adverse to the interests of the company or the industry, there-
by weakening the controls which impel corporate managers to .act in the public interest.
Cf. Brewster, The Corporation and Economic Federalism, in MASON, THE CORPOTION
IN MODER SqCETY 72, 74-75 (1959). In .addition to giying, cQrporate managers' opinions
an overly eff~cive impact on the eledf-fitte, political use of corporate funds could enable
officers to frame the issues for public debate. Cf. BLAISDELL, XAMERICAN DEmOcRAcy UNDER
PRESSURE 4 (1957).
240. Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 403 (1953); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336
U.S. 77, 86 (1949) (dictum) ; Smith v. Ervin, 64 So. 2d 166 (Sup. Ct. Fla. 1953) ; MEIKEL-
JOHN, op. cit. supra note 239, at 24-25 (1960).
241. None of the companies polled had set up separate accounting for political expenses.
QUESTIONNAIRE.
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expected to react realistically 242 to occasional revelations of political activity
or to determine what, if any, additional legal controls are needed to supple-
ment the present means of supervising corporate political activities.
Disclosure, might be compelled by the Securities Exchange Commission
under § 13 (a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 243 which requires every
issuer of a security registered on a national securities exchange and every
issuer required to file a registration statement to file such reports as the Com-
mission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate for the protection of in-
vestors. The Commission might require annual reports filed in compliance
with regulations now in effect,2 44 to include a statement of the costs of political
training programs, the amounts paid to employees under released time pro-
grams, and the amounts spent directly or indirectly (through contributions to
business leagues, trade associations, and "educational" organizations), to in-
fluence the political views of shareholders, customers, employees, and the
public. In addition, the Commission could require a company to identify the
objective of any single campaign which accounted for more than, say, 5 % of
the total amount spent. Since annual reports filed with the Commission are
not generally available to stockholders, and other interested parties, the figures
reported to the SEC could be summarized in proxy statements accompanying
solicitation of shareholder votes for use at the annual meeting.245 A regulation
of this kind might meet the statutory requirement that it be necessary or ap-
propriate for investors, on the theory that political programs may be a factor
in financial success; investors should be supplied with some information to
enable them to appraise the probable impact of the program upon future
earnings and current costs. Disclosure would also enable shareholders to take
appropriate action if an unreasonable amount of corporate funds were being
devoted to political purposes.246 The regulation would also make information
available to journalists and political scientists, thus making possible a reason-
able appraisal of the program's over-all impact, and enabling management's
concern for public reaction to serve as an effective check on excessive ex-
penditures and on the selection of propaganda objectives.
If the several dangers latent in corporate political programs do in fact
materialize, a second look at existing mechanisms to control their scope and
administration seem in order. The control mechanisms examined in this
242. Instead, legislation will result from startling revelations of improper practices.
Under these circumstances, statutes enacted are likely to be improperly drafted to achieve
unanalyzed goals. This was one of the difficulties with the Corrupt Practices Acts passed
as a result of a general public furor following in the .wake of investigations into political
contributions by corporations. - -
24.. 48 Stat. 894 (1934); 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1958).
244. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-1, 210.5-03(b) (6) (1949). The statute and regulations apply
solely to companies listed on a national securities exchange, thereby exempting a great
many large, endocratic corporations from the disclosure requirements.
245. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1 to 240.14a-9 (1960 Supp.).
246. Cf. Abrams v. Allen, 297 N.Y. 52, 74 N.E.2d 305 (1947).
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Comment have proved, on analysis, to be inadequate to cope with the problems
that may be posed. In part, this inadequacy stems from over-emphasis on the
shareholder-who is probably least likely to be affected by corporate politick-
ing-and, in part from the unsophisticated equation of corporate politics and
corruption imbedded in the corrupt practices acts.
As suggested previously, dollar limitations on corporate political spending
might protect the interests of shareholders and the public. But other controls
would be necessary to protect the interests of employees.
Corporate political programs are not likely to intimidate unionized hourly
rated workers, whose promotion, discharge, and job privileges are governed
by collective bargaining agreements administered by unions. But the programs
could seriously infringe upon the freedom of managerial employees who must
depend upon the favor and acceptance of their superiors for advancement.
Only one state has experimented with comprehensive legislation designed to
control this. Section 3172 of the Mississippi Code imposes criminal sanctions
upon any corporate officer or employee who uses actual or threatened dis-
charge or a change in pay scale as a sanction to affect the vote of any em-
ployee.247 In addition, the statute prohibits an employee or officer from making
any statement calculated to intimidate or coerce any employee in the exercise
of his political rights. Finally, by forbidding an employer to request any em-
ployee to perform services for any candidate, the statute appears to protect
employees from abuse of released-time programs. Wider enactment of leg-
islation of this kind, and the addition of civil remedies,248 could assist man-
agerial employees to retain their political independence in the face of ex-
tensive political efforts by managements.
At best, such statutes could strike at only the most flagrant abuses, since
the subtle factors involved in assessing the competence of managerial em-
ployees would tend to obscure the presence of political discrimination. But, by
articulating public concern for employee political independence and by oc-
casional application of sanctions, the statute could serve as a reminder of the
expected standard of behavior.
247. Miss. CODE ANN. § 3172 (1957).
248. The Mississippi statute does not provide for civil remedies. An employee, there-
fore, could neither compel a company violating the statute to respond in damages nor
secure appropriate equitable relief unless he had been hired for a term. Bell v. Faulkiner,
75 S.W.2d 612 (Mo. Ct. App. 1934).
[Vol. 70:821
